Tag: World News

Update for Crude Oil Prices

Current Market Performance vs. Predictions

In December 2025, many experts, commentators and analysts predicted that there would be an oversupply of crude oil in 2026, resulting in an oil glut caused by an increasing supply and weaker demand. Analysts suggested that the price of Brent Crude will average $58 bbl. At the time of writing, Brent crude futures traded up to $70 per bbl. for the first time since September 2025. Geopolitical tensions have helped bolster prices, with the global oil benchmark* rising by around 2.75%, while its US counterpart, West Texas Intermediate, climbed to just over $65 per barrel.

*Key Global Oil Benchmarks – The primary benchmarks are Brent Crude (North Sea), which covers 80% of global traded volume and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) (US), which is a key benchmark for the Americas. Dubai Crude is also used as a benchmark for Middle Eastern oil sent to Asia.

Impact of Geopolitical Escalations

The recent rise in crude oil prices has mostly been attributed to President Donald Trump, who threatened Iran with military action unless they agree to a nuclear arms agreement. Experts suggest that the threat issued via President Trump’s social media (Truth Social) yesterday evening, where he said that US ships had been ordered to the region and were ready to ”fulfil their mission with speed and violence, if necessary”, is responsible for the escalation in geopolitical premium of oil priced by potentially $3.00 – $4.00 per bbl.

Supply Disruptions and Global Conflict

Beyond the impact of geopolitical tensions on crude oil prices, the recent rise has also been driven by major supply disruptions in Kazakhstan. Prices were further supported last Friday after President Putin dampened hopes of a long-term settlement in the war with Ukraine. Experts advise that, despite the oversupply and lower prices that were predicted for this year, oil prices are expected to remain elevated for the time being as the markets wait for the next move by the White House and Iran. Analysts have reported that Tehran have stepped up negotiations with its OPEC+* counterparts and key Middle Eastern countries in an effort to stave off American aggression.

*OPEC+ – is short for the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Nations and is a coalition of 23 oil-producing countries, of which the full members are Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. There are a further 10 non-OPEC Partner Countries that form the OPEC+ and make up the DoC (Declaration of Cooperation), consisting of Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Russia, South Sudan and Sudan. The whole group’s modus operandi is to cooperate to influence the global oil market and stabilise prices.

Short-Term Outlook and Future Risks 

Experts advise that in the short-term (the next 4 to 6 weeks), based on technicals, the price of Brent Crude is estimated to trade within a range of $60 – 70 per bbl, with any movement being driven by geopolitical or inventory headlines. Despite a mid-range of analysts’ assessments of 2 – 3 million bbl per day, it is expected that today’s prices of crude oil will remain at the current level. Today, however, Iran has threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz, and analysts advise that this will definitely spike the price of oil and will no doubt, according to political and military experts, lead to military intervention from the United States.

Drill Baby Drill: Why Expanding Oil Production Still Matters for Economic Growth, Security & Global Stability

For more than a decade, public debate surrounding energy has been defined almost entirely by the imperative of decarbonisation, ESG screens, and the political urgency of transitioning toward renewables. Governments, sovereign wealth funds, and large institutional capital allocators have been encouraged — and in many cases compelled — to shift funding away from hydrocarbons and toward solar, wind, hydrogen, and batteries. Yet the hard reality that continues to assert itself is simple: global societies remain overwhelmingly dependent on hydrocarbons, both as an energy source and as the irreplaceable feedstock for industrial production and logistics.

The much-maligned “Drill Baby Drill” policy position, shorthand for expanding domestic oil and gas extraction,  is often caricatured as outdated, environmentally negligent, or backwards-looking. But stripped of the politics, the logic of increased oil production remains compelling on economic, national security, and industrial grounds. For companies operating within the energy supply chain, traders, producers, refiners, and logistical operators, this reality is especially clear: hydrocarbons are not disappearing, the world is still short of energy, and the opportunity to fund and profit from oil transactions remains structurally significant for at least the next three decades.

At IntaCapital Swiss SA, we specialise in structured collateral financing, trade finance, and capital facilitation for legitimate, well-documented transaction flows — including oil trading, allocation funding, shipping, and production-linked financing. From our vantage point in the capital markets, the pro-production energy thesis is not ideological; it is grounded in commercial practicality and global macro conditions.

Oil Remains the Dominant Energy Source — And it Will For Decades

The starting point is empirical reality. Despite unprecedented investment into alternative energy, hydrocarbons still account for:

  • Over 80% of the global primary energy supply
  • Over 95% of transportation fuel
  • Near 100% of aviation, maritime, and heavy machinery fuel

Even optimistic transition forecasts from major agencies — including the IEA, EIA, and OPEC — anticipate substantial oil demand well into 2050, driven largely by non-OECD population growth, shipping expansion, urbanisation, fertiliser needs, plastics, petrochemicals, lubricants, and synthetic materials.

The “energy transition” debate tends to assume that oil is primarily a motor-fuel problem. But one cannot build solar panels, wind turbine blades, semiconductors, medical polymers, or electric vehicle tyres without petroleum derivatives. Even renewables depend on hydrocarbons for extraction, smelting, transportation, composite manufacturing, and installation.

Oil is not just a fuel — it is a foundational industrial material.

Expanding Production Lowers Costs & Protects Consumers

The economics of energy supply are as straightforward as any other commodity market: when production lags consumption, prices rise. For the last decade, policy pressures and ESG capital restrictions have underfunded upstream development. As a result, reserves have not been replaced at the pace required to stabilise long-term pricing.

When oil supply is restricted, the effects cascade across the economy:

  • Transport costs increase
  • Logistics and freight inflate
  • Food becomes more expensive
  • Manufacturing input costs rise
  • Consumer goods absorb energy-linked price increases
  • Governments face inflationary pressures

Discipline in upstream investment may be popular with shareholders seeking dividend yield and with activists focused on decarbonisation, but it is economically regressive. The households most impacted by expensive energy are not the wealthy; they are lower-income consumers for whom fuel and food expenditures represent a larger share of disposable income.

Expanding production through offshore platforms, shale development, onshore drilling campaigns, and improved refineries throughout has the opposite effect: downward pressure on prices, improved logistics competitiveness, and reduced inflationary strain throughout the economy. In macro-economic terms, an expanded hydrocarbon supply is profoundly pro-consumer.

Energy Security Cannot Be Outsourced

Perhaps the most powerful argument for expanding domestic oil production is geopolitical. Nations that rely on imported energy — particularly from adversarial or unstable regions — incur strategic vulnerabilities. Europe learnt this lesson twice in modern history: first with the geopolitical leverage of Russian natural gas, and more recently with global LNG and diesel supply constraints.

Energy is strategic sovereignty. If a nation cannot feed, fuel, and defend itself without foreign supply chains, it does not control its own outcomes. For this reason, countries including the United States, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Brazil, Angola, and Canada are increasingly expanding their upstream capacity despite public climate rhetoric. The “Drill Baby Drill” position — when recast in strategic language — simply states: Domestic energy production equals national security.

From an investor and lender standpoint, energy security translates into long-duration capital commitments, infrastructure build-out, and predictable export revenue streams. These are precisely the conditions under which private corporate funding, trade finance, and structured collateral facilities thrive.

Oil Revenues Fund the Transition — Not the Other Way Around

Another uncomfortable truth: every successful renewable transition in history has been funded by fossil fuel prosperity. Nations that possess hydrocarbons — particularly Saudi Arabia, UAE, Norway, and the United States — are not abandoning fossil fuels. They are monetising them to accelerate modernisation, diversification, and future energy integration.

The slogan could be inverted as: Drill Baby Drill = Finance Baby Finance. It is not oil vs renewables; it is oil funding renewables. When oil is scarce and expensive, consumer acceptance of energy transition weakens, and governments lose the fiscal room to subsidise innovation. When oil is abundant and competitively priced, governments can directly channel cash flow into infrastructure, EV charging networks, nuclear modularity, and battery chemistry R&D. The global transition requires capital, and hydrocarbons remain the financial engine that provides it.

Market Liquidity in Oil Trade Creates Funding Opportunity

For firms like IntaCapital Swiss SA, the significance of expanded oil production is not merely theoretical; it directly influences transaction demand. The global oil and refined products sector is characterised by:

  • High-value spot and forward trades
  • Allocation-based offtake agreements
  • Refinery output contracts
  • Shipping and storage operations
  • Letters of credit utilisation
  • Collateralised performance obligations
  • Intermediated allocation structures

Where barrels are moving, there is demand for:

  1. Allocation funding
  2. Performance bonds
  3. Trade finance lines
  4. Collateral transfer facilities
  5. Warehouse & shipping finance
  6. Refinery output pre-financing
  7. Syndicated export structures
  8. Commodity-backed funding instruments

Historically, energy traders and allocation holders have faced funding gaps due to collateral requirements, KYC/AML scrutiny, or misalignment between banking risk appetites and commodity settlement cycles. Structured private capital has filled that gap — and continues to do so globally. Expansion in upstream production directly increases this flow, creating a larger universe of transactions requiring structured funding and credit enhancement.

Why ESG Capital Boycotts Created a Funding Vacuum

Over the last five years, major banks and sovereign funds adopted stringent ESG restrictions on hydrocarbon investments. While politically fashionable, this capital withdrawal has created a financing scarcity that private lenders, hedge funds, commodity houses, and structured intermediaries are now exploiting.

The irony is unavoidable:

  • Oil demand increases
  • Oil supply is constrained
  • Capital is restricted from upstream investment
  • Price volatility rises
  • Private capital steps in at a premium

Far from eliminating oil, ESG has made oil more profitable for those willing to fund it. For financing firms who understand the sector, this environment has created attractive margins, strong collateralisation structures, and heightened demand from credible counterparties seeking allocation funding or offtake financing.

The Global South Will Drive Oil Demand, Not the West

Another misconception often embedded in Western policy discourse is the assumption that energy demand patterns are uniform across the globe. They are not. Over the next 25 years, population growth and middle-class expansion in Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East will drive incremental consumption of:

  • Diesel
  • Jet fuel
  • Marine bunker fuel
  • Chemicals and plastics
  • Fertilisers
  • Asphalt
  • Petrochemicals

Even if OECD nations reach aggressive EV penetration and renewable diversification targets, the Global South is only beginning its industrial build-out. This difference is not ideological; it is demographic and developmental. The global oil industry will therefore not contract — it will re-centre.

Conclusion: Expanded Oil Production Is Rational, Beneficial & Bankable

The “Drill Baby Drill” energy thesis is not a relic of the past. It is an economically rational, strategically necessary, industrially indispensable, and financially attractive proposition anchored in material demand. The global economy still runs on hydrocarbons, and it will continue to do so for decades. Transition will occur — but it will not eliminate the need for oil; it will simply change the demand profile.

For companies involved in the sector — from upstream production to trading, refining, shipping, allocation management and distribution — the implication is clear: the real bottleneck is not rhetoric, it is capital.

Funding Oil Transactions — IntaCapital Swiss SA

IntaCapital Swiss SA facilitates structured financing for credible oil and refined product transactions globally. We support:

  • Allocation funding
  • Performance bonding & collateral transfer
  • Refinery & pre-export financing
  • Offtake funding
  • Collateral-enhanced trade finance structures

Applicants seeking oil transaction funding, allocation financing, or credit enhancement are invited to present their proposal for review, including:

  • Allocation or supply documentation
  • ICPO, SPA, or equivalent
  • Transaction flow structure
  • Counterparty details
  • Required financial instruments or facilities

To discuss funding options in confidence, contact our transaction structuring team.

Outlook for Global Currencies 2026

Experts in the currency markets suggest that in 2026, projections show that the US Dollar will be weaker against most major currencies, primarily driven by easing from the Federal Reserve, as other central banks normalise policies, suggesting a narrowing of interest rate differentials. The Pound is expected to be on the volatile side and may see modest gains against the US Dollar, the Japanese Yen may appreciate gradually, whilst the Australian Dollar and the Euro are expected to firm modestly.

GBP/Sterling – GBP

Analysts in the sterling arena expect the pound to experience headwinds in Q1 and Q2 of 2026, mainly due to interest rate cuts, weak growth and political uncertainty. Cable (GBP/USD) may well strengthen if the new chairman of the Federal Reserve decides on a faster rate-cutting cycle, whilst GBP/EUR may well trend lower as the US Dollar weakens, and monetary policy divergence could well benefit the Euro. However, experts warn speculators that markets could be infused with volatility due to geopolitical problems, especially between Russia and Europe.

Several financial experts and commentators have suggested that the BOE’s (Bank of England) MPC (Monetary Policy Committee) decisions in 2026 could be the primary risk to Sterling. If financial conditions worsen in 2026, the BOE has stated that it will further loosen monetary policy, and experts suggest that if inflation eases, growth and the labour market remain slow, and there could be multiple rate cuts across 2026, resulting in a negative impact on the pound, whilst also dampening its appeal.

US Dollar – USD

Analysts suggest that the financial market outlook for the US Dollar for 2026 remains bearish for Q1 and Q2, but the greenback may rally slightly in the second half of the year with only a modest decline by year’s end. These forecasts are based on analysts’ persistent concerns regarding the independence of the Federal Reserve, plus the possibility of lower interest rates. The DXY* is expected to face a turbulent time with considerable headwinds in Q1 of 2026. Whilst it enjoyed a high point at the start of 2025 (above 110), it was down 9.1% by the close of business 31st December, and it is expected to hit the mid-range 90’s by the end of this year.

*The DXY (US Dollar Index) – This index was created by the Federal Reserve in 1973 after the Bretton Woods** system ended and is now maintained by ICE Data Indices (the Intercontinental Exchange, which provides a comprehensive suite of global financial benchmarks). This index measures the US Dollar’s strength against a basket of six currencies: the Canadian Dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, Pound Sterling, Swedish Krona, and the Swiss Franc. The index rises when the US Dollar strengthens and falls when it weakens, serving as a key benchmark for traders, businesses and central banks to gauge dollar performance.

**Bretton Woods – This system was a post- World War II international monetary framework that established a system of fixed exchange rates by pegging major currencies to the US Dollar, which was in turn convertible into gold. The system aimed to foster global economic stability and prevent the competitive currency devaluations and protectionism that contributed to the Great Depression and the previously mentioned war. The US Dollar was the world’s primary reserve currency and the only one directly convertible into gold for foreign governments and central banks at a fixed rate of $35 per ounce.

The system collapsed due to persistent American balance of payments deficits, rising inflation from Vietnam War spending and the resultant surplus of US Dollars held by foreign central banks (which eventually exceeded the US gold reserves) and eroded confidence in the dollar’s convertibility to gold. As such, on August 15th, 1971, President Richard Nixon unilaterally announced the suspension of the US Dollar direct convertibility to gold.

The independence of the Federal Reserve is a key factor as to where the US Dollar will go in 2026, and many market experts have their eyes on not only the replacement of the chair of the Federal Reserve (a President Trump pick) but also whether or not President Trump is successful in his attempts to oust Fed Governor Lisa Cook. If he is successful, experts advise that there will be more outflows from US assets, particularly in AI and fixed income, placing more negative pressure on the greenback, especially if the President is then emboldened to try and remove further Fed governors.

While some expect the US Dollar to weaken, a contrary argument suggests that this dip will be temporary. Analysts believe that by Q3 2026, the combined impact of government spending and new trade tariffs will likely drive up inflation. This would force the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates, which would, in turn, push the value of the US Dollar higher.

Despite the predicted uptick in the US Dollar, the currency will still face many roadblocks, such as dealing with the massive debt limit, a potential AI bubble burst and increasing challenges from member nations of BRICS***

***BRICS – Is an intergovernmental agency and is an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China, (all joined in 2009) followed by South Africa in 2010 as the original participants. Today, membership has grown to include Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, with Thailand and Malaysia on the cusp of joining. Russia sees BRICS as continuing its fight against Western sanctions, and China, through BRICS, is increasing its influence throughout Africa and wants to be the voice of the ‘Global South’. Several commentators feel that as the years progress, BRICS will become an economic and geopolitical powerhouse and will represent a direct threat to the G7 group of nations. Currently, this group represents 44% of the world’s crude oil production, and the combined economies are worth in excess of USD28.5 Trillion equivalent to 28% of the global economy.

The Euro – EUR

In 2025, the Euro managed to record one of its strongest rallies since 2016 against the sterling and the US Dollar, its strongest rally since 2017. President Trump’s tariff policy proved to be extremely beneficial for the Euro*, and despite several interest rate cuts, the ECB’s (European Central Bank) boosting of the local economy was considered most beneficial. Some analysts favour another rate cut in 2026, but most appear to favour the ECB remaining on the sidelines as ECB President Christine Lagarde and her board of governors seem content with both the outlook for growth and inflation.

US Tariffs Beneficial to the Euro – Whilst tariffs were not inherently beneficial to the Euro (they often hurt EU exporters), they could indirectly strengthen the Euro by making EU goods reactively more expensive for U.S. buyers or causing US consumers to buy cheaper EU goods when tariffs were applied to other countries –  thus improving the competitive field for EU products in the US market leading to potential Euro strength.

A number of analysts have a bullish stance for the Euro in 2026, expecting the currency to gain against most currencies, except those in Scandinavia, with reservations against the pound sterling. Exchange experts have predicted that by year-end 2026, the EUR/USD will stand at 1.22, expecting the majority of US Dollar weakness to emerge after Q1, whilst projections for sterling and Japanese yen are EUR/GBP 0.84 and EUR/JPY 189. Analysts suggest that positive impacts on the currency will emerge post Q1, such as German fiscal policy, Chinese stimulus measures and currency hedging activities.

Adding to the bullish sentiment for the Euro, experts advise that foreign investors have returned to the European equity and bond markets, and with the ECB currently happy with inflation, 2026 should see a continuation of the inflow of capital. Analysts suggest that the inflow should increase if Russia and Ukraine manage to sign a peace accord to end the war. On 23rd February 2025, a German government coalition was formed, and later they passed a Euro 1 trillion spending package, which experts feel will continue to support the Euro. One downside is France and the country’s ongoing political turmoil, which did limit gains in 2025, and analysts believe this will carry on into 2026.

Japanese Yen – JPY

Currency experts advise that the demand for Yen in 2026 will remain modest, leaning towards tepid in response to the BOJ’s (Bank of Japan) raising interest rates by 25 basis points to 0.75% (the highest level since September 1995) on 19th December 2025. Currency experts suggest that the soft response to the increase in interest rates is that financial markets are worried about Japan’s fiscal sustainability, especially as they feel there is an unfavourable policy mix of expansionary fiscal policy with loose monetary policy, which continues in real terms to keep yields low in Japan.

Some analysts suggest that the narrowing interest rate differential between Japanese bonds and their counterparts in the United States represents a fundamental driver in 2026 for an increase in the strength of the Japanese yen. If the Federal Reserve proceeds with expected interest rate cuts in 2026 and the BOJ proceeds with expected interest rate hikes, analysts advise that there should be downward pressure on USD/JPY during 2026. Financial markets are also aware of Yen carry trades, and sharp currency movements in either direction could precipitate an unwinding of these positions, currently valued by some analysts at USD 1 trillion.

Swiss Franc – CHF

The outlook for the Swiss Franc in 2026 is that investors will still view the currency as a very strong haven in times of global economic volatility and geopolitical upheavals. However, some experts suggest that if global economic and geopolitical conditions begin to stabilise in 2026, the currency could gradually weaken against the Pound Sterling and the Euro, especially if interest rate differentials come into play.

Other key drivers for the CHF  are economic growth divergence, where analysts forecast that the Euro may appreciate slightly against the CHF if, during 2026, a modest recovery occurs in the Eurozone and other key trading partners, reducing the premium on Switzerland’s haven status. Monetary policy divergence is another driver, and analysts advise that the SNB will probably keep interest rates low or even move to 0.00%, whilst the Federal Reserve and maybe the ECB will adjust their policies, which in turn can affect exchange rates.

Overall, the main arguments in favour of the Swiss Franc are low inflation, low debt, political stability, a high current account surplus and a highly innovative economy. Couple the above with the recent agreement on tariffs with the Trump administration, which has eliminated a serious threat to the country’s competitiveness, the Swiss Franc stands out as a top safe-haven currency. Several forex analysts predict that in 2026, the EUR/CHF will edge higher, whilst it is felt that the USD/CHF may stabilise around the 0.78 mark.

Chinese Renminbi  – CNY

A number of experts and analysts have forecasted a slight appreciation of the Renminbi against the US Dollar in 2026, with the USD/CNY ending the year in a range of 6.85 and 7.05. Such predictions are based on a persistently large current account surplus, the PBoC’s (People’s Bank of China) priority on currency stability and narrowing yield differentials with the USA. With regards to currency stability, the PBoC is expected to utilise policy tools such as the daily fixing, which manages volatility and to continue with gradual monetary easing, which includes rates and RRR (Reserve Requirement Ratio)* cuts in order to support domestic growth.

*Reserve Requirement Ratio – This represents the portion of deposits that banks in China must hold in reserve, and ifthe  PBoC cuts the RRR, it will boost liquidity and support economic growth. Interestingly, the RRR is not uniform, with larger banks having a RRR of 9% and smaller banks 6%.

On the domestic front, challenges like the current property market downturn, deflationary pressures and weak consumer demand could negatively impact appreciation pressures on the currency, whilst geopolitical pressures such as trade tensions between China and the United States (currently enjoying what may be a temporary truce*) could also put negative pressure on the Renminbi. However, further fiscal policy will be seen by the issuance of front-loaded 2026 bonds in Q1 of this year, plus the implementation of two RMB 500 billion stimulus packages introduced at the end of Q3 and beginning of Q4 last year.

*Trade Truce – The current trade tensions between the United States and China are currently enjoying a one-year sabbatical, which could be thrown into disarray as President Trump is threatening 25% tariffs on goods from all countries that trade with Iran.

Australian Dollar – AUD

Experts suggest a fairly positive outlook for the Aussie Dollar in 2026, with potential appreciation against a number of currencies, especially the US Dollar, with drivers suggested as strong commodity prices and diverging monetary policies. The RBA (Reserve Bank of Australia) has, amid upward inflationary pressures, adopted a somewhat hawkish stance with financial markets pricing in an early rate hike in 2026, whilst the Federal Reserve are again expected to implement one or two rate cuts this year with experts predicting a negative impact on the US Dollar and a positive impact on the Australian currency.

On the commodity front, the AUD and commodity exports are closely tied together (e.g. Iron Ore $116 Billion, Oil and Gas $82.5 Billion, LNG $72.6 Billion, Coal Mining $71.4 Billion), and significant support for the currency is expected to come from continuing strength and an across-the-board recovery in global commodity prices. Furthermore, the health of China’s economy is an important driver of the AUD (not the primary driver that it used to be) as it is Australia’s biggest trading partner. Foreign exchange experts are predicting that by the close of business in 2026, AUD/USD is expected to be near the 0.68 level.

Canadian Dollar – CAD

Along with the United States, both countries are signatories to the US-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA – replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement – NAFTA in July 2000), which is up for renegotiation this year, with President Donald Trump threatening to withdraw even though it makes up 25% of trade with the USA. Whilst no one can predict the outcome of the review, this is a potential wild card that can impact both the Canadian and Mexican currencies.

Analysts expect the Canadian Dollar (AKA the Loonie*) to strengthen against the US Dollar if, as expected, the Federal Reserve continues its monetary easing cycle by cutting rates again in 2026, whilst the BoC (Bank of Canada) has signalled the possibility of halting monetary easing in 2026. As a result, several forex analysts have suggested that at the end of Q2, the USD/CAD could be sitting at 1.3488 and at the end of 2026, it is projected to sit at 1.3507.

*The Loonie – The Canadian Dollar is also affectionately referred to as “the Loonie” because in 1987 a popular $1 coin was introduced into the monetary system featuring a “common loon” (a distinctive waterbird) on its reverse side.

Experts are expecting the Canadian economy to enjoy a modest positive impetus in 2026, projecting a growth of circa 1.4% with support coming from government investment/spending initiatives, plus a potentially improving trade outlook, giving the Canadian Dollar a boost in Q3 and Q4. A negative review of the USMCA could result in an escalation in current trade tensions, weighing negatively on the currency, whilst a fall in oil prices is expected to have the same effect.

Mexican Pesos – MXN

In 2025, the Mexican Peso closed out the year 22% higher than the beginning of the year against the US Dollar, and underlying the increase were higher interest rates in Mexico, whilst the Federal Reserve engaged in monetary easing, and companies exporting to the USA moved their manufacturing base to the United States. Further positive impacts on the Peso were strong wage growth, new records for international visitors and tourism and stable economic conditions under the current President, Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo.

Experts advise that continued high rates relative to interest rates in the United States into 2026 will make Mexican Assets attractive under the carry trade scenarios, which will provide a positive impact for the Peso especially if the Federal Reserve continues on its dovish monetary path. If continued international tourism increases, plus ongoing nearshoring* together with continued FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) into Mexico, such factors will continue driving strong demand for the currency. According to a number of analysts in the peso arena, they expect the currency to remain around 19 pesos per dollar in 2026, though there are those analysts who predict that the peso will end the year in the upper 17-peso range.

*Nearshoring – is a business strategy where a company moves its base of manufacturing or services usually to a country that is geographically close or shares a border with the country the company is exporting to, e.g. Mexico/USA.

Emerging Market Currencies Overview

Experts from emerging markets (EM) suggest the outlook for currencies in 2026 is fairly positive, with the expectation that they will appreciate against the US Dollar due to a dovish Federal Reserve monetary policy. Capital inflows into EM assets will be encouraged by the anticipated Federal Reserve interest rate cuts, improving EM economic fundamentals and moderating inflation. Currently, EM assets are trading at a discount to their counterparts in the developed economies, which is attracting capital inflows, especially as investors seek yield and portfolio diversification.

What are the Consequences of a United States Invasion and Takeover of Greenland?

A Shift from Rhetoric to Reality

Once unthinkable, today the staggering reality is that the United States of America, under the leadership of President Donald Trump, could actually invade and claim ownership of Greenland, a country owned by its European ally, the Kingdom of Denmark. Last Friday, 9th January, President Trump increased his rhetoric by saying, “I would like to make a deal, you know, the easy way. But if we don’t do it the easy way, we are going to do it the hard way.” In other words, he is willing to secure the territory by abusing international law by marching into Greenland and taking over.

The Shadow of Venezuela and the NATO Crisis

In the past, the musings of President Trump about taking over Greenland were not taken seriously by his European allies (members of NATO* – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation). The recent invasion of Venezuela has brought home the stark reality that President Trump could easily live up to his word and invade Greenland. As usual, when it comes to geopolitical and global economic surprises, the leaders of the EU (European Union) have been found wanting. Indeed, Mette Frederiksen, Prime Minister of Denmark, said an attack by the United States on Greenland could spell the end of NATO.

*NATO – the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is a political and military alliance of 32 countries from Europe, North America and Great Britain. Founded in 1949 for collective security and mutual defence against aggression, NATO was created primarily to counter Soviet aggression, with its core principle being Article 5: an attack on one member is an attack on all, obligating members to assist. NATO provides a forum for defence consultation and cooperation, managing crises and ensuring the security of its members. Today, we have a scenario where the strongest member (the United States) potentially attacks a weaker member; the consequences to geopolitics and global economics are potentially devastating.

Strategic Objectives: Security and Resources

Experts now suggest that since the invasion of Venezuela, President Trump is now willing to deploy the U.S. military to achieve his foreign policy goals, with Greenland currently top of the President’s shopping list. In both his presidential campaigns, Trump’s table-thumping mantra of “America First” has never been more pertinent to both his enemies and his allies, but what is it about Greenland that has given President Trump his thirst for invasion? Experts say that the President wants America to own Greenland for national security reasons and not for rare earth minerals; however, in recent years, both Russia and China have become interested in the minerals that can be found in Greenland, not to mention the potential bonanza of oil and gas reserves.

The China-Russia Security Threat

In the United States, many Republican lawmakers agree with President Trump that China and Russia pose a significant security risk—a threat that would increase dramatically if either country gained controlling influence over Greenland. Consequently, experts foresee two potential paths: President Trump could reach an economic agreement with Denmark for joint control, or he could simply leverage the military might of the United States to secure the territory, given that few could realistically stand in the way.

The European Response and Territorial Integrity

However, the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederickson, has warned that any attempt to take over Greenland would result in the end of the long-standing transatlantic alliance. Furthermore, she recently announced on Danish TV that Greenland belongs to Greenlanders, whilst European leaders have urged President Trump to respect the island’s territorial integrity and said it falls under the bloc’s collective security umbrella. 

The consequences of a move to Greenland by the United States will be far-reaching. Currently, in Europe, political analysts advise that the continent is paralysed, with no set strategy to address the threats from President Trump. Experts suggest that if the situation deteriorates even further, with one member of NATO turning against another, NATO will not survive. The EU (European Union) is not designed to step in militarily if NATO collapses. 

The “Donroe Doctrine” and Global Instability

President Trump has already deposed the President of Venezuela (citing the Munro Doctrine*), citing influence from Russia and China, plus drug flows, as his reasons. The United States has coveted Greenland on and off for over 150 years, and as President Trump ups the ante over Greenland, one expert suggests that transatlantic relations are now on the brink of a fundamental breakdown. On top of this, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Keir Starmer, has suggested putting British troops into Greenland. Imagine two NATO allies in direct conflict over Danish territory; the geopolitical implications are unthinkable.

*The Munro Doctrine – Declared by President James Munro in 1823, this was a U.S. foreign policy stating that the Americas were no longer open to European colonisation and warned against European interference in the Western Hemisphere, whilst the U.S. pledged non-interference in European affairs, establishing distinct spheres of influence and becoming a cornerstone of centuries of U.S. foreign policy. Key tenets include non-colonisation, non-intervention in European politics and separating American and European political systems and later expanded to justify intervention in “Latin America”.

Global Repercussions: Russia and Taiwan

On the global front, experts suggest that the United States/Greenland saga must be music to the ears of Russia’s President Putin, and not only will it legitimise in his eyes the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but also embolden him to further increase military and political pressure on the country’s leaders, hoping that they will sue for peace. Elsewhere, and as most people know, China’s leaders have always thought that the independent and sovereign state of Taiwan belongs to China, and the potential takeover by the United States of Greenland will surely embolden them to invade Taiwan. Several experts have agreed that these scenarios are a distinct possibility, and with the President of Venezuela already deposed, both China and Russia may view the potential invasion of Greenland as a green light for their own political ambitions.

The Semiconductor Crisis and the Cost of “America First”

Interestingly, Taiwan manufactures over 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of its most advanced chips. Some experts suggest that, emboldened by President Trump’s actions in Venezuela or a potential move into Greenland, China may decide to invade Taiwan. Such a move would grant China control over nearly 90% of the global microchip supply, effectively making the United States and Europe dependent on China for everything from mobile phones and electric vehicles to basic household appliances like washing machines and tumble dryers. 

Analysts suggest that in order to compensate for this, the United States would have to develop increased chip-making facilities, which would need circa 50 critical minerals. Yes, Greenland has about 30 of these minerals, but with no industrial infrastructure or workforce, how long would it take the United States to catch up? All in all, President Trump’s ‘America First’ may well turn out to be a pyrrhic victory with China holding the trump cards on critical minerals and semiconductors/microchips. What concessions will then have to be made by the West to the potential upcoming political demands from China?

Lukoil Declares Force Majeure in Iraq

Russian oil major Lukoil has declared a force majeure at its Iraqi oilfield West Qurna-2, as it struggles under the recently imposed sanctions by the United States. The declaration marks the most significant fallout from the sanctions as President Trump continues his efforts to broker peace between Russia and Ukraine. Lukoil, which has considerable exposure to international markets, has already failed in its attempt to sell its foreign assets to Gunvor (a Swiss commodity trader), after the United States signalled its opposition to the deal.

West Qurna-2, located approximately 40 miles (65 kilometres) northwest of the port city of Basra, is considered the jewel in the crown of Lukoil’s assets and is among the world’s largest oilfields. The company has maintained a global presence through upstream oil and gas projects, as well as refining and fuel retail networks across Europe, the Middle East, the Americas, and Central Asia. Outside Russia, Lukoil accounts for around 0.5% of global oil output, equivalent to approximately 500,000 barrels per day (BPD).

Lukoil owns 75% of West Qurna-2, which, according to data released in April this year, was producing about 480,000 BPD. However, following the declaration of force majeure, Lukoil now has the right to suspend contractual obligations. Experts note that the field will not be shut down entirely, as operations have been handed over to two state-run Iraqi companies. Indeed, SOMO (Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Company) has already cancelled three Lukoil cargoes scheduled for loading in November. Furthermore, Iraq has halted all crude and cash payments to Lukoil since the new sanctions came into force.

Analysts report that, according to an unnamed Iraqi official, if Lukoil fails to resolve the force majeure conditions within six months, the company will be required to cease production and withdraw from the project entirely. Lukoil’s ongoing difficulties have prompted what experts describe as a scramble across Europe to maintain operations at the company’s assets ahead of the 21st November deadline, when all dealings with Lukoil must cease. In Bulgaria, for example, the government has taken steps to assume full control of the country’s largest refinery to safeguard jobs. Several countries have also requested that Washington issue licences allowing them to continue operating Lukoil’s assets beyond the November cut-off date.

Despite Lukoil’s declaration of force majeure in Iraq, crude oil prices opened lower today, with analysts observing that market sentiment remains largely bearish due to projections of oversupply. Many oil market commentators suggest that with OPEC production increasing, global demand slowing, and economic growth weakening across major oil-consuming nations, bearish sentiment continues to dominate the supply side.

Russia Hit with New Oil Sanctions

Last week on 22nd of October, in Washington D.C, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) announced that further sanctions on major Russian oil companies were being imposed due to Russia’s lack of serious commitment to a peace process to end the war in Ukraine. Experts advise that the aim of this increased pressure on Russia’s energy sector is to weaken President Putin’s ability to generate revenue for the war effort and to sustain an already fragile economy.

The sanctioning of both Rosneft and Lukoil* by the United States coincided with the EU’s 19th package of sanctions on Russia, which included a ban on Russian LNG (liquefied natural gas) imports. The United Kingdom had also added to its own sanctions list the previous week.

Rosneft – A vertically integrated energy company specialising in the exploration, production, refining, transportation, and sale of petroleum, petroleum products, and LNG. The Russian Government owns around 40.4% of the company, with the Qatar Investment Authority also holding a significant stake.

Lukoil – Engaged in the exploration, production, refining, marketing, and distribution of oil and gas across Russian and international markets. Lukoil is privately owned, with its founder, Vagit Alekperov, holding approximately 28.3%.

President Trump’s sanction package targeting Rosneft and Lukoil has triggered repercussions in the world’s two most populated nations, India and China. Experts report that a number of oil companies in both countries have begun cancelling orders ahead of the sanction deadline of 21st November 2025, fearing potential retaliation from the White House for sanction busting.  Analysts estimate that Russia exports between 3.5 and 4.5 million barrels of oil per day to Asia, with a significant portion coming from the newly sanctioned firms. However, experts warn that once the deadline passes, exports of between 1.4 and 2.6 million barrels per day to China and India could completely dry up.

Under OFAC’s latest rules, U.S. secondary sanctions may also be imposed for providing material support to Lukoil or Rosneft, or for operating within Russia’s energy sector. In essence, sanctions can be triggered by any significant transaction involving these companies. The threat of being banned from the U.S. financial system is expected to deter potential sanction busters from engaging in new or existing business with either firm.

The EU’s new sanctions package will prohibit the import or transfer, directly or indirectly, of Russian LNG from 25th April 2026, except for long-term contracts entered into before 17th June 2025. The EU’s implementation has been slower than that of the U.S. and UK due to its greater dependence on Russian LNG.

Meanwhile, both the European Union and the United Kingdom continue to target vessels operating within the so-called shadow fleet*, which is used to transport Russian oil and bypass Western sanctions. The UK has also imposed asset freezes on several companies supplying Russia with critical electronics for missiles and drones. Additionally, the EU has identified 45 new companies and entities that are directly supporting Russia’s war effort by helping to circumvent export restrictions on advanced technology.

Shadow Fleet – A collection of around 45 ageing, uninsured oil tankers used by Russia to export oil while evading Western sanctions. These vessels typically have opaque ownership structures, often sail under false flags, and operate outside the Western financial system. This enables Russia to sell oil below the Western-imposed price cap of USD 60 per barrel, designed to limit Moscow’s export revenues.

The latest round of sanctions is expected to result in increased enforcement activity and greater regulatory scrutiny, particularly if the United States maintains its renewed aggressiveness. With relatively short wind-down periods for both Lukoil and Rosneft, sanctioning authorities will need to act swiftly and with heightened diligence. Strong cross-border coordination among multinational organisations will be essential to ensure a robust and effective sanctions compliance framework.

President Trump and the Tariff Trade Wars

On Thursday, 23rd October, President Donald Trump announced that he was halting all trade negotiations with Canada, blaming an advertisement funded by the Ontario Government, which cast negative connotations on his tariff plans by featuring the voice of former President Ronald Reagan. The advert used excerpts from a 1987 speech in which President Reagan criticised tariffs as outdated while defending the principles of free trade. Last year, the United States and Canada exchanged in excess of USD 900 billion in goods and services, and the cancellation of trade talks by President Trump has cast a cloud of uncertainty over bilateral trade relations between the two nations.

President Trump’s announcement, made via his Truth social media stated:

“Tariffs are very important to the National Security and economy of the U.S.A. Based on their egregious behaviour, all trade negotiations with Canada are hereby terminated”.

Experts suggest that the President is convinced the Ontario Government timed the adverts (which have been shown more than once) to coincide with a case in the Supreme Court challenging the legality of the tariffs, and to sow discord among Republican supporters. Canada’s Prime Minister, Mark Carney announced on Friday that the country was ready to resume trade talks with the United States and would pause the advert on Monday in the hope that U.S. trade officials would return to the negotiating table.

In a surprise move, President Trump predicted that Brazil and the United States may be able to “pretty quickly” strike a trade deal, despite having imposed punitive tariffs on Brazil earlier this year over the prosecution of former ally Jair Bolsonaro. Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister Mauro Vieira stated that he hoped sanctions on Brazilian officials would be lifted and that he expected trade negotiations to be completed within weeks.

President Trump is attending the 47th ASEAN Summit and Related Summits in Kuala Lumpur from 26th – 28th October 2025, where he has held several meetings with regional leaders concerning tariffs. He is seeking to increase access to markets for U.S. agricultural goods and, crucially for his administration, to secure access to critical minerals and rare earth sectors. Such framework agreements will include exemptions from tariffs on key exports to the United States for several Southeast Asian countries, including Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam.

The United States has released a framework for a trade agreement with Vietnam, which will offer zero tariffs on selected products while granting preferential treatment by the Vietnamese Government to U.S. agricultural and industrial exports. A White House Statement said the agreement is expected to be finalised in the coming weeks, adding that both countries had agreed commitments on investment, digital trade, and services, though further details were not provided.

It has also been announced that a reciprocal trade framework between the United States and Thailand has been reached, under which the U.S. will maintain a 19% tariff on Thai exports, while identifying certain products where tariffs could be reduced or removed. Thailand will eliminate tariffs on approximately 99% of U.S. exports, covering industrial, food, and agricultural products. Both countries also signed a pact giving U.S. companies preferential access to rare earth minerals, crucial in manufacturing high-tech products such as jet engines and semiconductors. However, information released so far remains limited and given that China controls around 90% of the rare earth market, the overall impact for the U.S. may be modest.

Malaysia, as host of the 47th ASEAN Summit, has signed a Joint Trade and Critical Minerals Agreement with the United States aimed at improving trade across Southeast Asia and countering China’s tightening control of rare earth mineral exports. Analysts say the agreement gives Malaysia an advantage in accessing the U.S export market and, in return, Malaysia will develop its rare earth and critical mineral sectors with U.S firms, while addressing barriers that affect investment, digital trade and services. Furthermore, Malaysia will commit to purchasing products from U.S companies and restricting the export of any U.S. items on the unauthorised list.

Finally, China and the United States are both keen, according to experts, to avoid further escalation of the current trade war, and have shown signs of progress. After China increased export controls on rare earth and critical minerals, President Trump responded by imposing China with 100% tariffs on Chinese goods. However, on 26th October, it was announced that U.S. and Chinese trade and economic officials had reached an agreement on a framework for bilateral trade, and President Trump confirmed that he expects to finalise a trade deal with President XI Jinping in the coming days. Only time will tell whether the United States and China can reach a sustainable long-term agreement.

The Global Banking System at Risk from the USD 4.5 Trillion Private Credit Market

Senior Wall Street figures have voiced growing concerns that the global banking system could be facing serious risks from the USD 4.5 trillion private credit market. The main worries centre on risky lending practices, potential contagion, and a lack of transparency, all underscored by recent high-profile bankruptcies. Because the private credit market operates outside traditional banking regulations, it tends to carry higher leverage and riskier loans, which could spill over into the wider financial system and impact banks and investment firms around the world.

The sense of unease across Wall Street has deepened amid fears that large-scale defaults in the private credit market could trigger a broader systemic shock. Experts note that global credit has expanded rapidly over the past decade, with particularly sharp growth in private credit. Senior finance figures explain that this wave of expansion typically starts with private credit, then extends into high-yield bonds* and leveraged loans**, both of which amplify financial risk

*High Yield Bonds – In finance, a high-yield bond is one rated below investment grade by credit agencies. These bonds offer higher returns but carry a greater risk of default. They are often issued by start-ups, highly leveraged companies, capital-intensive industries, or so-called “fallen angels”, firms that once held investment-grade ratings but have since dropped below the threshold.

**Leveraged Loans – These are high-risk loans granted to companies with weak credit histories or heavy debt loads. Because of the elevated risk, they come with higher interest rates. There’s no strict definition for what constitutes a leveraged loan, but they are generally identified by low credit ratings or large margins above benchmark interest rates, such as floating-rate indexes that determine how loan costs fluctuate over time.

Investor anxiety intensified recently when two major car parts suppliers in the private credit space, both carrying multi-billion-dollar debts, declared bankruptcy amid fraud allegations. At the same time, two regional banks revealed they were sitting on several irrecoverable bad loans. The news sparked a sharp sell-off across both U.S. and U.K. stock markets last week. Analysts said many investors fear this could be just “the tip of the iceberg,” prompting a rush to safer assets.

In the U.K., data showed that within the FTSE 100, investors sold off shares in Schroders and ICG, both seen as particularly exposed to the private credit market. Banking stocks also fell sharply, reflecting concerns that traditional lenders are more deeply tied to this market than previously thought. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently warned that global banks’ exposure to private credit, often dubbed the “shadow banking sector”, amounts to around USD 4.5 trillion, a figure larger than the entire U.K. economy. The IMF also cautioned that as many as one in five banks could face significant trouble if the sector deteriorates further.

IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva has publicly admitted to “sleepless nights” over the potential risks stemming from non-bank financial institutions. Financial commentators say her concerns arise from the lack of regulatory oversight in this sector, where non-bank lenders can take on risks that traditional banks would likely avoid. The absence of third-party scrutiny only compounds the problem, leaving markets in the dark about the true scale of exposure. The world learned painful lessons during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, and with the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank in 2023 still fresh in memory, few are willing to rule out another shock on the horizon.

Silver Soars Above $50 as Squeeze Hits London Silver Market

On Thursday, 9th October, silver breached the $50 per ounce mark for the first time since the 1980s, evoking memories of the Hunt brothers*, before continuing its climb to reach a high of $51.23 per ounce. The surge in silver prices, already up by around 70% since the start of the year, has been driven by investors rushing to safe-haven assets such as silver, gold, and other precious metals, as well as by a surge in demand from India. Another key factor is silver’s critical role in industrial markets, with wind farms and solar panels now accounting for nearly half of global demand.

*Hunt Brothers – Nelson Bunker Hunt and his brother were Texas oilmen whose worldview was shaped by a sense that the odds were stacked against them. With inflation at 15%, scrutiny from the IRS (Internal Revenue Service), and tensions with Muammar Gaddafi, they felt under siege. After refusing Gaddafi’s demand for half the profits from their Libyan oil fields, the Hunts saw their assets seized. Determined to protect their wealth, Nelson Hunt decided to hedge against inflation by hoarding silver, leading the brothers to begin one of the most infamous market plays in modern history.

Experts note that Nelson Hunt was not a typical “buy and sell” trader. Out of paranoia and conviction, he and his brother began stockpiling silver in 1973, when it was priced at just $2 per ounce. By 1980, the price had reached $45 per ounce and was still rising. The Hunts had amassed around 200 million ounces of silver, and the craze spread. People sold family heirlooms, thieves targeted silverware, and anything containing silver was melted down, all of which pushed prices even higher.

The fallout prompted regulators to act. On 7th January 1980, both **COMEX and the Chicago Board of Trade introduced emergency measures, including higher margin requirements. Experts at the time said the new rules effectively outlawed further silver buying, allowing only liquidation contracts. Prices soon collapsed from a high of $49.45 per ounce to $16.60 by 18th March that year. After years of legal battles and financial manoeuvring, the Hunt brothers eventually lost everything.

** COMEX – The Commodity Exchange, a division of the CME Group, is a global derivatives marketplace that allows clients to trade futures and options across major asset classes. It also provides clearing and data services and serves as the main exchange for trading metals such as gold, silver, copper, and aluminium.

Fast-forward to the 21st century, and the London Silver Market is experiencing what many describe as a historic squeeze. As prices continue to rise, the mismatch between supply and demand has become so severe that a global hunt for bullion is underway.

Some traders are even booking space on commercial flights from New York to London (a costly method) to transport silver bars and take advantage of the $1.20 per ounce arbitrage opportunity seen on Monday this week. The shortage of silver bars has been fuelled by several factors, starting with Donald Trump’s threat to impose tariffs on the metal. This prompted a mass exodus of bars across the Atlantic as traders rushed to beat potential levies.

Other contributing factors include a spike in demand from India, increased debasement trading (where investors sell currencies and buy safe-haven metals as global debt climbs), and production shortfalls among miners who are failing to keep pace with demand. Additionally, large volumes of silver are held in vaults underpinning ETF trading, meaning they cannot easily be sold or leased. The leasing market has become so tight that traders holding short spot positions are paying sky-high rates to borrow silver to roll over their contracts.

Market analysts in London believe that natural momentum will eventually see silver bars flow back to the city from reserves elsewhere, helping to ease the shortage. However, traders in New York remain hesitant to export silver to London, as the US government lockdown could cause customs delays, potentially costing millions in missed opportunities. There is also widespread caution over President Trump’s potential tariffs on silver, which is under investigation as a critical mineral under Section 232. Should the US decide not to impose tariffs, part of the squeeze in London could ease. The coming four to six weeks will be crucial in determining how this tightness in the London silver market unfolds.

Precious Metals and Bitcoin Rise on the Back of Debasement Trades

A financial strategy in which investors allocate funds to assets such as Bitcoin and gold as a hedge against the devaluation of fiat currencies is known as a debasement trade. Key drivers include rising sovereign or government debt, geopolitical instability, and inflation. Experts note that investors have been selling major currencies and moving towards alternative assets such as gold (both physical and ETF), silver, Bitcoin, and even certain collectables such as Pokémon cards, which recently reached an all-time high.

Data released indicates that investors have added momentum to debasement trades due to growing concerns over fiscal challenges affecting many of the world’s largest economies, several of which are struggling under an expanding burden of debt. Analysts also highlight that political instability within these economies has further encouraged investors to pursue debasement hedges by purchasing gold, Bitcoin, and other crypto assets, particularly as the US dollar, Japanese yen, and euro face mounting fiscal and political pressures.

Experts suggest that one of the main reasons investors are rebalancing their portfolios is the rising debt levels in countries such as the United States, Japan, and across the Eurozone. These nations are finding it increasingly difficult to manage their debt piles, which in turn has enhanced the appeal of debasement trades. Gold opened today, surpassing USD 4,000 per ounce, a new record, as it continues to demonstrate its role as a safe haven amid economic and geopolitical uncertainty. Recent data also revealed that Q3 saw the largest global gold ETF monthly inflow on record at USD 17 billion, resulting in the strongest quarter ever, totalling USD 26 billion.

On the Bitcoin front, the cryptocurrency has risen steadily over the past year, driven largely by President Trump’s introduction of crypto-friendly legislation. However, the United States is grappling with a massive debt load, standing at USD 37.88 trillion as of the close of business on 30th September 2025 and still climbing. The ongoing US government shutdown has also acted as a strong buy signal for Bitcoin, much of it linked to debasement-related transactions.

Indeed, on Sunday 5th October Bitcoin reached USD 125,689, surpassing its previous record set on 14th August this year, driven primarily through Bitcoin ETFs. Data shows the coin is up 30% for the first three quarters of the year. Yesterday, 6th October, Bitcoin hit another record of USD 126,279 with the US dollar having weakened approximately 30% against the cryptocurrency this year. Several Wall Street analysts now predict Bitcoin will reach between USD 160,000 and USD 180,000 by the close of business on 31st December 2025.

Analysts advise that investors engaging in or considering debasement trades need only to look at France for an example of why hedging has become increasingly common. Newly appointed Prime Minister Sebastian Lecornu lasted only 26 days in office, surpassing the brevity of former UK Prime Minister Liz Truss’s record by 23 days. The French leader did not even manage to deliver an inaugural address to parliament, let alone present a budget that could achieve cross-party support.

Commentators suggest that debasement trading will continue an upper trajectory, as Europe contends with instability in France and beyond. Japan has also unsettled markets with a newly elected pro-stimulus Prime Minister and concerns over further debt expansion. In the United Kingdom, the Chancellor is preparing a budget that many expect to be highly contentious. Meanwhile, in the United States, already burdened by an out-of-control debt pile, a prolonged government shutdown, and a President seeking to assert influence over the Federal Reserve, the pressure continues to mount.