Author: IntaCapital Swiss

Why International Capital is Sitting Out the UK — And Why a Post-Labour Britain Will See Billions in Deployment

For decades, the United Kingdom has been positioned as one of the most reliable and sought-after destinations for foreign investment. Open markets, stable legal frameworks, predictable tax treatment, property rights, deep financial services markets, and liberalised capital flow policies made Britain a global magnet for institutional money. The UK attracted sovereign wealth, private equity, pension capital, infrastructure funds, venture growth investment, and strategic acquisitions across sectors ranging from real estate and energy to fintech and advanced manufacturing.

However, since the election of the current Labour government, the behaviour of international capital has become unambiguous: investors have paused deployment, elevated their risk premiums, and postponed commitment to long-duration UK exposure. This is not anecdotal — it is observable in real estate transaction collapse, delayed capex, higher yields demanded for UK risk, muted M&A flows, stalled strategic investment, and private capital reallocating into other OECD markets.

To understand why billions of dollars remain sidelined — and why investors openly anticipate a deployment surge once Labour exits power — we must examine how international capital allocates: not through ideology, theatre, or messaging, but through the sober mathematics of regulatory forecasting, taxation, policy predictability, and expected return.

Investment Hates Uncertainty — And Labour Has Created It

Foreign investment is not sentimental. It does not deploy into jurisdictions because they are fashionable or because newspapers say it is the “right thing to do.” It deploys where outcomes are predictable, rules are durable, and returns can be modelled over 10-20-year horizons.

The Labour government’s economic approach has triggered the opposite conditions:

Tax uncertainty

Regulatory ambiguity

Industrial hostility toward private capital

Disincentives for wealth creation

Unpredictable energy and planning policy

Mixed messaging on business investment

This is not ideological critique; it is how investors interpret signals.

When a government signals that capital gains, property, corporate distribution, inheritance, wealth, or windfall taxes are “in scope,” investors do not wait to see the details. They wait to deploy capital until the threat is removed. Labour has spent its tenure signalling precisely these threats.

The UK Economy Needs Investment — But Treats Investors as a Problem

The contradiction at the heart of current policy is straightforward: Britain needs investment across infrastructure, housing, energy, innovation, and industry — yet the government treats investors as if they are rent-seeking exploiters who must be constrained or punished.

International capital observes this contradiction and acts rationally: it waits.

Countries competing with the UK — particularly Canada, US Sunbelt states, Ireland, UAE, Singapore, Netherlands, Australia, and parts of Central Europe — have moved aggressively in the opposite direction. They are making capital welcome. They are bidding for it. They are cutting friction, stabilising rules, and streamlining approvals.

Capital goes where capital is valued.

Policy Hostility Toward Wealth & Property Freezes Deployment

One of the most damaging signals to foreign investors has been Labour’s overt hostility toward high-value property ownership, private wealth, and non-domiciled capital.

The UK property market historically represented not only a store of value, but an entry point for global capital to participate in UK economic activity. It pulled in private investment, development finance, family offices, sovereign wealth, and institutional funds.

Since Labour’s ascent, the reaction has been swift:

• Deal volumes in prime London property have dropped sharply

• Developers have delayed or cancelled projects

• Overseas buyers have paused offers

• Family offices have rerouted allocations to Dubai, Portugal, Singapore, and the US

• Private lenders have increased risk premiums on UK exposure

• Equity partners have delayed capital calls for UK projects

The equation is simple: if a government telegraphs that property and wealth are targets not assets, capital sits out.

Corporate Investment Requires Regulatory Predictability

Corporations — particularly multinationals — deploy based on predictable multi-year regulatory frameworks. Labour’s approach to energy, infrastructure planning, environmental compliance, and corporate taxation has been erratic and politically reactive.

Industries particularly affected include:

• North Sea energy

• Renewable deployment

• Logistics and ports

• Data centres

• Heavy industry

• Manufacturing

• Financial services

• Advanced technology clusters

Private capital is not allergic to regulation; it simply demands clarity. Under Labour, regulation has become unpredictable, politicised, and declarative rather than technocratic. Investors cannot model returns under those constraints — so they defer until the political cycle resets.

The Risk Premium on UK Exposure Has Quietly Risen

Investors price political and regulatory uncertainty into their required return. Under Labour, the UK’s perceived risk premium has risen, even without formal rating downgrades. This manifests as:

• Higher yields demanded for UK real asset projects

• Larger carry limits in private debt

• Lower valuations in strategic acquisition targets

• Delayed M&A strategies

• Reallocation to other OECD markets

• Reduced foreign participation in new issuance

• Decline of inward portfolio investment flows

This is exactly what stagnation looks like: capital not fleeing, but waiting.

Capital Is Mobile — And It Is Currently Parking

The fundamental miscalculation of the Labour government is the assumption that capital has nowhere else to go. In the 1980s that might have been true; in the 2020s it is profoundly wrong. Capital today has abundant substitutes:

Singapore for HQs and wealth

UAE for property and tax-neutral investment

Ireland for corporate domiciliation

US Sunbelt for industrial investment

Portugal & Italy for relocation capital

Luxembourg & Switzerland for financial services

The UK used to be the default Western hub for capital. Under Labour, it is now one of many competing jurisdictions — and capital will always choose the path with the lowest friction and highest predictability.

Billions Are Sitting On the Sidelines — Waiting for Political Clearance

Here is the most important point: capital has not forgotten the UK. It has paused.

Institutional allocators, family offices, sovereign funds, infrastructure groups, pension consortia, and strategic investors are already briefing their boards that UK deployment is a “post-Labour cycle” strategy.

When Labour leaves the government, the dam breaks. Investors are waiting for:

1. Tax clarity

2. Property stability

3. Corporate and wealth policy normalisation

4. Regulatory predictability

5. A pro-investment mandate

6. A government that views capital as an enabler rather than an enemy

Once those conditions are restored, deployment will be rapid and large. The capital is already assigned. The deal teams are already modelling. Fund investment committees are already discussing the UK as a re-entry market pending political clearance.

When the political friction disappears, the UK becomes once again one of the most attractive Western jurisdictions for:

• Infrastructure capital

• Real estate capital

• Private equity

• Sovereign wealth

• Energy & resources

• Technology clusters

• Financial services consolidation

• Family office relocation

The UK’s structural advantages — legal infrastructure, language, time zone, financial markets, property rights, talent pool, and global connectivity — have not gone away. They are simply being smothered by a government that misunderstands how investment behaves.

Labour Has Frozen Capital — But It Has Not Eliminated It

International investment into the UK will remain stagnant so long as the current Labour government continues to create uncertainty, punish wealth, broadcast hostility to private capital, and politicise regulation. The UK is not unattractive — it is merely uninvestable in the current policy climate.

Billions of dollars are not fleeing the UK; they are waiting for permission to return.

When Labour falls, expect a capital surge reminiscent of:

• 1980s financial liberalisation

• Post-ERM capital expansion

• Post-Brexit currency arbitrage inflows

• 1990s private equity boom

Investors are patient. They are disciplined. They are watching.

The UK is not finished — it is paused.

The UK Economy from the Swiss Perspective: Why International Capital Is Paused on the UK — and Why It Will Redeploy When Labour Is Gone

Switzerland views global capital flows with a uniquely unemotional lens. For decades the country has acted as a neutral observer, allocator, and recipient of worldwide financial activity, analysing long-range trends rather than reacting to political cycles. From Zurich and Geneva’s vantage point, the United Kingdom has always been one of Europe’s most attractive deployment markets for private capital, strategic acquisitions, and real asset investment. It offered common-law protections, mature financial services, deep liquidity, and globally recognised property rights.

However, since the arrival of the current Labour government in London, Swiss institutions have observed a marked shift in investor behaviour: capital deployment has slowed, strategic activity has paused, and underwriting committees have reclassified the UK from “stable deployment market” to “wait-and-see market.” This is not due to currency volatility or geopolitical shocks, but to the political and regulatory posture of the government itself.

Switzerland is not ideological. It simply follows capital — and today capital has pressed the pause button on the UK.

Investment Pauses When Predictability Is Lost

Swiss institutions are highly sensitive to long-term regulatory clarity. Pension funds, insurers, family offices, and private banks evaluate jurisdictions by their ability to remain predictable across decades, not parliamentary cycles. The Labour government’s approach to corporate taxation, property ownership, wealth treatment, and environmental regulation has introduced uncertainty that makes long-term modelling complex.

Uncertainty has a price. When risk cannot be quantified, Swiss allocators do the only rational thing: they delay.

Under Labour, London no longer offers the assumption of regulatory stability that Zurich or Geneva require for 10–20-year capital commitments. Switzerland observes the following UK signals with caution:

• Possible wealth taxation

• Possible windfall taxation

• Property and non-dom regime hostility

• Unclear energy and infrastructure policy

• Anti-private capital rhetoric

• Increasing regulatory politicisation

Swiss investors do not exit markets over political language alone — but they will not deploy at scale until the policy environment stabilises.

Switzerland’s View: Capital Is Not Ideological — It Is Selective

One of the most consistent errors made in London political circles is the belief that capital has no alternative. From the Swiss perspective, this assumption is outdated. Capital has become globally mobile and aggressively competitive jurisdictions are actively courting it.

Today capital can flow to:

• Switzerland for financial stability and wealth management

• Ireland for corporate domiciliation

• UAE for tax neutrality and property development

• Singapore for strategic Asia allocation

• Netherlands for holding company efficiency

• Luxembourg for fund structuring

• US Sunbelt for manufacturing and industrial expansion

The UK used to be the European default for large allocations. Under Labour, it has become “one of many options,” which dramatically changes its bargaining position.

From Switzerland, the question is not “Why avoid the UK?” but “Why choose the UK over jurisdictions that are actively welcoming capital?”

Currently, Switzerland sees few UK policies that answer that question convincingly.

Real Estate and Property: An Asset Class Paused

Swiss family offices and wealth managers have historically been active in UK residential and commercial property. Prime London property served both as a store of wealth and as a collateral base for broader investment strategies. Since Labour’s ascent, Switzerland has observed a sharp reduction in the willingness of international capital to engage in UK property.

The reasons are structural:

• Tax risk to non-doms and foreign owners

• Politicisation of property ownership

• Planning policy ambiguity

• Anti-private landlord rhetoric

• Falling rental yield incentives

• Currency hedging complications

Meanwhile, Switzerland observes Dubai, Lisbon, Milan, and Zurich taking the opposite approach — inviting high-net-worth relocation, encouraging property investment, and stabilising tax treatment.

Unsurprisingly, Swiss family offices have increased allocations to these markets while slowing UK exposure.

Corporate & Strategic Capital Require Technocratic Stability

Swiss institutions also observe that Labour’s regulatory approach has become politically expressive rather than technocratic. Industries including energy, heavy infrastructure, logistics, and manufacturing rely on 10–25 year planning horizons. When regulatory frameworks are altered by ideology or narrative instead of long-term industrial strategy, investors step back.

Swiss allocators distinguish between:

Policy that expresses values, and

Policy that produces deployment conditions

The Labour government frequently delivers the former at the expense of the latter.

Switzerland notes this contrast not out of judgement but because it creates a comparative advantage. Swiss authorities communicate regulatory changes years in advance, consult industry, protect capital formation, and maintain cross-party consensus on taxation. This consistency attracts capital that London currently deters.

The Swiss Risk-Pricing Lens: The UK Just Became More Expensive

Switzerland’s financial institutions reprice jurisdictions continuously. Under Labour, the UK has acquired a higher implied risk premium, reflected in:

• Higher expected returns demanded

• More conservative underwriting assumptions

• Delayed private equity entry

• Reduced infrastructure appetite

• Stalled cross-border M&A

• Lower real estate development funding

• Reduced mezzanine and private debt issuance

• Minimal sovereign wealth participation

Crucially, Switzerland does not interpret this as permanent. It sees it as cyclical and political.

The financial conclusion is clear:

The UK is not a bad market; it is a temporarily unattractive one.

This is an important distinction.

The Swiss Expectation: A Post-Labour Surge in Deployment

Unlike media narratives which operate in weekly cycles, Swiss allocators model political cycles. The view held by many institutions in Zurich, Geneva, and Lugano is straightforward:

• Deployment now is unattractive

• Deployment later is compelling

• Timing depends on political transition

Swiss investment committees are already building post-Labour UK scenarios. Allocation plans are being drawn. Funds are preparing mandate revisions. Real estate operators are warming capital pools. Strategic acquirers are mapping distressed opportunities. Sovereign and pension funds are modelling entry timing.

There is no hostility to Britain — merely discipline.

When Labour falls, Switzerland expects:

• swift property reactivation,

• private equity re-entry,

• infrastructure capital injection,

• renewed sovereign wealth participation, and

• strategic corporate acquisition.

Billions in capital are not avoiding the UK; they are reserving for it.

What Switzerland Gets In The Meantime

The pause in UK deployment has produced an unintended benefit for Switzerland: capital is being temporarily housed in Swiss custodial, advisory, fund, and wealth platforms. Banks in Zurich and Geneva report higher liquidity retention and reduced deployment outflow toward London, which strengthens Swiss asset management and AUM bases.

Put differently:

If capital cannot deploy to London, it parks in Zurich.

This is not ideological. It is simply financial logistics.

Switzerland Sees a Paused UK — Not a Declining UK

From a Swiss vantage point:

• Capital has paused on the UK

• The pause is political, not structural

• The catalyst for re-entry is the exit of the Labour government

• Switzerland benefits interim through custodial inflow

• The UK will become deployable again once policy normalises

The UK still possesses extraordinary competitive advantages: common law, language, talent, markets, property rights, and global connectivity. These fundamentals have not eroded; they have merely been fenced in by a government that misunderstands how investment behaves.

When Labour is gone, Switzerland expects capital to flow back into Britain rapidly and at scale. The money is waiting. The committees are waiting. The strategies are waiting. The cycle is waiting.

The UK is not finished; it is deferred.

Drill Baby Drill: Why Expanding Oil Production Still Matters for Economic Growth, Security & Global Stability

For more than a decade, public debate surrounding energy has been defined almost entirely by the imperative of decarbonisation, ESG screens, and the political urgency of transitioning toward renewables. Governments, sovereign wealth funds, and large institutional capital allocators have been encouraged — and in many cases compelled — to shift funding away from hydrocarbons and toward solar, wind, hydrogen, and batteries. Yet the hard reality that continues to assert itself is simple: global societies remain overwhelmingly dependent on hydrocarbons, both as an energy source and as the irreplaceable feedstock for industrial production and logistics.

The much-maligned “Drill Baby Drill” policy position, shorthand for expanding domestic oil and gas extraction,  is often caricatured as outdated, environmentally negligent, or backwards-looking. But stripped of the politics, the logic of increased oil production remains compelling on economic, national security, and industrial grounds. For companies operating within the energy supply chain, traders, producers, refiners, and logistical operators, this reality is especially clear: hydrocarbons are not disappearing, the world is still short of energy, and the opportunity to fund and profit from oil transactions remains structurally significant for at least the next three decades.

At IntaCapital Swiss SA, we specialise in structured collateral financing, trade finance, and capital facilitation for legitimate, well-documented transaction flows — including oil trading, allocation funding, shipping, and production-linked financing. From our vantage point in the capital markets, the pro-production energy thesis is not ideological; it is grounded in commercial practicality and global macro conditions.

Oil Remains the Dominant Energy Source — And it Will For Decades

The starting point is empirical reality. Despite unprecedented investment into alternative energy, hydrocarbons still account for:

  • Over 80% of the global primary energy supply
  • Over 95% of transportation fuel
  • Near 100% of aviation, maritime, and heavy machinery fuel

Even optimistic transition forecasts from major agencies — including the IEA, EIA, and OPEC — anticipate substantial oil demand well into 2050, driven largely by non-OECD population growth, shipping expansion, urbanisation, fertiliser needs, plastics, petrochemicals, lubricants, and synthetic materials.

The “energy transition” debate tends to assume that oil is primarily a motor-fuel problem. But one cannot build solar panels, wind turbine blades, semiconductors, medical polymers, or electric vehicle tyres without petroleum derivatives. Even renewables depend on hydrocarbons for extraction, smelting, transportation, composite manufacturing, and installation.

Oil is not just a fuel — it is a foundational industrial material.

Expanding Production Lowers Costs & Protects Consumers

The economics of energy supply are as straightforward as any other commodity market: when production lags consumption, prices rise. For the last decade, policy pressures and ESG capital restrictions have underfunded upstream development. As a result, reserves have not been replaced at the pace required to stabilise long-term pricing.

When oil supply is restricted, the effects cascade across the economy:

  • Transport costs increase
  • Logistics and freight inflate
  • Food becomes more expensive
  • Manufacturing input costs rise
  • Consumer goods absorb energy-linked price increases
  • Governments face inflationary pressures

Discipline in upstream investment may be popular with shareholders seeking dividend yield and with activists focused on decarbonisation, but it is economically regressive. The households most impacted by expensive energy are not the wealthy; they are lower-income consumers for whom fuel and food expenditures represent a larger share of disposable income.

Expanding production through offshore platforms, shale development, onshore drilling campaigns, and improved refineries throughout has the opposite effect: downward pressure on prices, improved logistics competitiveness, and reduced inflationary strain throughout the economy. In macro-economic terms, an expanded hydrocarbon supply is profoundly pro-consumer.

Energy Security Cannot Be Outsourced

Perhaps the most powerful argument for expanding domestic oil production is geopolitical. Nations that rely on imported energy — particularly from adversarial or unstable regions — incur strategic vulnerabilities. Europe learnt this lesson twice in modern history: first with the geopolitical leverage of Russian natural gas, and more recently with global LNG and diesel supply constraints.

Energy is strategic sovereignty. If a nation cannot feed, fuel, and defend itself without foreign supply chains, it does not control its own outcomes. For this reason, countries including the United States, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Brazil, Angola, and Canada are increasingly expanding their upstream capacity despite public climate rhetoric. The “Drill Baby Drill” position — when recast in strategic language — simply states: Domestic energy production equals national security.

From an investor and lender standpoint, energy security translates into long-duration capital commitments, infrastructure build-out, and predictable export revenue streams. These are precisely the conditions under which private corporate funding, trade finance, and structured collateral facilities thrive.

Oil Revenues Fund the Transition — Not the Other Way Around

Another uncomfortable truth: every successful renewable transition in history has been funded by fossil fuel prosperity. Nations that possess hydrocarbons — particularly Saudi Arabia, UAE, Norway, and the United States — are not abandoning fossil fuels. They are monetising them to accelerate modernisation, diversification, and future energy integration.

The slogan could be inverted as: Drill Baby Drill = Finance Baby Finance. It is not oil vs renewables; it is oil funding renewables. When oil is scarce and expensive, consumer acceptance of energy transition weakens, and governments lose the fiscal room to subsidise innovation. When oil is abundant and competitively priced, governments can directly channel cash flow into infrastructure, EV charging networks, nuclear modularity, and battery chemistry R&D. The global transition requires capital, and hydrocarbons remain the financial engine that provides it.

Market Liquidity in Oil Trade Creates Funding Opportunity

For firms like IntaCapital Swiss SA, the significance of expanded oil production is not merely theoretical; it directly influences transaction demand. The global oil and refined products sector is characterised by:

  • High-value spot and forward trades
  • Allocation-based offtake agreements
  • Refinery output contracts
  • Shipping and storage operations
  • Letters of credit utilisation
  • Collateralised performance obligations
  • Intermediated allocation structures

Where barrels are moving, there is demand for:

  1. Allocation funding
  2. Performance bonds
  3. Trade finance lines
  4. Collateral transfer facilities
  5. Warehouse & shipping finance
  6. Refinery output pre-financing
  7. Syndicated export structures
  8. Commodity-backed funding instruments

Historically, energy traders and allocation holders have faced funding gaps due to collateral requirements, KYC/AML scrutiny, or misalignment between banking risk appetites and commodity settlement cycles. Structured private capital has filled that gap — and continues to do so globally. Expansion in upstream production directly increases this flow, creating a larger universe of transactions requiring structured funding and credit enhancement.

Why ESG Capital Boycotts Created a Funding Vacuum

Over the last five years, major banks and sovereign funds adopted stringent ESG restrictions on hydrocarbon investments. While politically fashionable, this capital withdrawal has created a financing scarcity that private lenders, hedge funds, commodity houses, and structured intermediaries are now exploiting.

The irony is unavoidable:

  • Oil demand increases
  • Oil supply is constrained
  • Capital is restricted from upstream investment
  • Price volatility rises
  • Private capital steps in at a premium

Far from eliminating oil, ESG has made oil more profitable for those willing to fund it. For financing firms who understand the sector, this environment has created attractive margins, strong collateralisation structures, and heightened demand from credible counterparties seeking allocation funding or offtake financing.

The Global South Will Drive Oil Demand, Not the West

Another misconception often embedded in Western policy discourse is the assumption that energy demand patterns are uniform across the globe. They are not. Over the next 25 years, population growth and middle-class expansion in Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East will drive incremental consumption of:

  • Diesel
  • Jet fuel
  • Marine bunker fuel
  • Chemicals and plastics
  • Fertilisers
  • Asphalt
  • Petrochemicals

Even if OECD nations reach aggressive EV penetration and renewable diversification targets, the Global South is only beginning its industrial build-out. This difference is not ideological; it is demographic and developmental. The global oil industry will therefore not contract — it will re-centre.

Conclusion: Expanded Oil Production Is Rational, Beneficial & Bankable

The “Drill Baby Drill” energy thesis is not a relic of the past. It is an economically rational, strategically necessary, industrially indispensable, and financially attractive proposition anchored in material demand. The global economy still runs on hydrocarbons, and it will continue to do so for decades. Transition will occur — but it will not eliminate the need for oil; it will simply change the demand profile.

For companies involved in the sector — from upstream production to trading, refining, shipping, allocation management and distribution — the implication is clear: the real bottleneck is not rhetoric, it is capital.

Funding Oil Transactions — IntaCapital Swiss SA

IntaCapital Swiss SA facilitates structured financing for credible oil and refined product transactions globally. We support:

  • Allocation funding
  • Performance bonding & collateral transfer
  • Refinery & pre-export financing
  • Offtake funding
  • Collateral-enhanced trade finance structures

Applicants seeking oil transaction funding, allocation financing, or credit enhancement are invited to present their proposal for review, including:

  • Allocation or supply documentation
  • ICPO, SPA, or equivalent
  • Transaction flow structure
  • Counterparty details
  • Required financial instruments or facilities

To discuss funding options in confidence, contact our transaction structuring team.

UK Economic Outlook: Navigating the Era of ‘High-Tax Stability’

The UK’s economic landscape is undergoing a fundamental shift. After years of market shocks, the current trajectory is moving toward a period of “High-Tax Stability.” For investors and business leaders, this means the risk of a sudden financial crisis has dropped, but the challenge of slow growth has increased.

This outlook reflects the current Labour government’s strategy of combining strict fiscal rules with historically high taxes between now and 2026.

The Core Shift: Stability Over Dynamism

The primary fear for the UK is no longer a sudden bond market crash, but rather a “slow-bleed” in private sector investment. Because the UK is facing a 70-year high tax burden and significant public debt, there is very little room for traditional economic stimulus. Instead, the government is pursuing a strategy of defensive consolidation, prioritising solvency and institutional safety over aggressive growth.

Assessing the Risks and Policy Mix

To understand where we are heading, we look at the key drivers of the UK economy:

  • Institutional Stability (Strong): The UK remains a safe harbour for capital because its legal and financial institutions are respected and predictable.
  • State-Led Investment (Execution Risk): The government is leaning on an activist, state-guided industrial strategy, using initiatives like the National Wealth Fund and GB Energy, to offset weaker private investment. However, the success of this approach depends heavily on effective execution.
  • Labour Market & Tax (High Risk): Increased costs for employers, such as the rise in National Insurance, are cooling the jobs market. We expect unemployment to hover around 5% as businesses adjust to the higher cost of doing business.
  • Green Transition (Sector Risk): While ambitious green targets are a priority, mechanisms like the planned carbon border tax could unintentionally hurt energy-intensive sectors, such as steel and chemicals, if not carefully designed.

What This Means for Investors

The era of “volatility plays”, betting on big, sudden market swings, is ending. We are now entering an era of efficiency and complexity. In this environment, opportunities are most likely found in assets that benefit from regulation and complexity, such as structured solutions, cross-border planning, and alternative capital. Success will require navigating a “Eurozone-style slog” where growth is modest (projected at 1-2%), but the environment is predictable.

The Bottom Line

The UK’s economic architecture is sound, but the engine is currently being throttled by a high tax and regulatory burden. For capital allocators, the UK offers the rare premium of predictability, provided you have the expertise to navigate a more regulated and sophisticated landscape.

A Brief Summary of the UK Economy under the Current Labour Government

To date, the UK economy is showing mixed signals. Real wages have improved, but have been countered by rising unemployment and a softening labour market. There are significant fiscal challenges (some inherited) where government policies, such as rising minimum wages and increased National Insurance (NI) rates, have negatively impacted business investment and future growth. These factors are now jeopardising 50% – 60% of the UK pub industry. The government has received mixed reviews, mainly negative, resulting in politically damaging U-turns, and whilst the economy has experienced modest growth, the country is suffering from weak productivity.

While recent data shows a slight improvement in GDP, growth remains fundamentally weak and hampered by long-term low productivity. Furthermore, negative forecasts have now overtaken previous optimism, suggesting that future growth will be slower than initially projected. On the jobs front, despite some vacancies, the labour market is still showing signs of weakening, together with a cooling in the jobs market.

The impact of government policies has harmed businesses with rises in employer NI, which has increased hiring costs and increased the minimum wage, also raising concerns for business costs. The government is struggling to balance and restore investment, which has declined due to a lack of confidence in its fiscal responsibility and integrity. When combined with persistently low productivity, this weak investment leaves the UK economy facing significant headwinds in the years ahead.

Outlook for Global Currencies 2026

Experts in the currency markets suggest that in 2026, projections show that the US Dollar will be weaker against most major currencies, primarily driven by easing from the Federal Reserve, as other central banks normalise policies, suggesting a narrowing of interest rate differentials. The Pound is expected to be on the volatile side and may see modest gains against the US Dollar, the Japanese Yen may appreciate gradually, whilst the Australian Dollar and the Euro are expected to firm modestly.

GBP/Sterling – GBP

Analysts in the sterling arena expect the pound to experience headwinds in Q1 and Q2 of 2026, mainly due to interest rate cuts, weak growth and political uncertainty. Cable (GBP/USD) may well strengthen if the new chairman of the Federal Reserve decides on a faster rate-cutting cycle, whilst GBP/EUR may well trend lower as the US Dollar weakens, and monetary policy divergence could well benefit the Euro. However, experts warn speculators that markets could be infused with volatility due to geopolitical problems, especially between Russia and Europe.

Several financial experts and commentators have suggested that the BOE’s (Bank of England) MPC (Monetary Policy Committee) decisions in 2026 could be the primary risk to Sterling. If financial conditions worsen in 2026, the BOE has stated that it will further loosen monetary policy, and experts suggest that if inflation eases, growth and the labour market remain slow, and there could be multiple rate cuts across 2026, resulting in a negative impact on the pound, whilst also dampening its appeal.

US Dollar – USD

Analysts suggest that the financial market outlook for the US Dollar for 2026 remains bearish for Q1 and Q2, but the greenback may rally slightly in the second half of the year with only a modest decline by year’s end. These forecasts are based on analysts’ persistent concerns regarding the independence of the Federal Reserve, plus the possibility of lower interest rates. The DXY* is expected to face a turbulent time with considerable headwinds in Q1 of 2026. Whilst it enjoyed a high point at the start of 2025 (above 110), it was down 9.1% by the close of business 31st December, and it is expected to hit the mid-range 90’s by the end of this year.

*The DXY (US Dollar Index) – This index was created by the Federal Reserve in 1973 after the Bretton Woods** system ended and is now maintained by ICE Data Indices (the Intercontinental Exchange, which provides a comprehensive suite of global financial benchmarks). This index measures the US Dollar’s strength against a basket of six currencies: the Canadian Dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, Pound Sterling, Swedish Krona, and the Swiss Franc. The index rises when the US Dollar strengthens and falls when it weakens, serving as a key benchmark for traders, businesses and central banks to gauge dollar performance.

**Bretton Woods – This system was a post- World War II international monetary framework that established a system of fixed exchange rates by pegging major currencies to the US Dollar, which was in turn convertible into gold. The system aimed to foster global economic stability and prevent the competitive currency devaluations and protectionism that contributed to the Great Depression and the previously mentioned war. The US Dollar was the world’s primary reserve currency and the only one directly convertible into gold for foreign governments and central banks at a fixed rate of $35 per ounce.

The system collapsed due to persistent American balance of payments deficits, rising inflation from Vietnam War spending and the resultant surplus of US Dollars held by foreign central banks (which eventually exceeded the US gold reserves) and eroded confidence in the dollar’s convertibility to gold. As such, on August 15th, 1971, President Richard Nixon unilaterally announced the suspension of the US Dollar direct convertibility to gold.

The independence of the Federal Reserve is a key factor as to where the US Dollar will go in 2026, and many market experts have their eyes on not only the replacement of the chair of the Federal Reserve (a President Trump pick) but also whether or not President Trump is successful in his attempts to oust Fed Governor Lisa Cook. If he is successful, experts advise that there will be more outflows from US assets, particularly in AI and fixed income, placing more negative pressure on the greenback, especially if the President is then emboldened to try and remove further Fed governors.

While some expect the US Dollar to weaken, a contrary argument suggests that this dip will be temporary. Analysts believe that by Q3 2026, the combined impact of government spending and new trade tariffs will likely drive up inflation. This would force the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates, which would, in turn, push the value of the US Dollar higher.

Despite the predicted uptick in the US Dollar, the currency will still face many roadblocks, such as dealing with the massive debt limit, a potential AI bubble burst and increasing challenges from member nations of BRICS***

***BRICS – Is an intergovernmental agency and is an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China, (all joined in 2009) followed by South Africa in 2010 as the original participants. Today, membership has grown to include Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, with Thailand and Malaysia on the cusp of joining. Russia sees BRICS as continuing its fight against Western sanctions, and China, through BRICS, is increasing its influence throughout Africa and wants to be the voice of the ‘Global South’. Several commentators feel that as the years progress, BRICS will become an economic and geopolitical powerhouse and will represent a direct threat to the G7 group of nations. Currently, this group represents 44% of the world’s crude oil production, and the combined economies are worth in excess of USD28.5 Trillion equivalent to 28% of the global economy.

The Euro – EUR

In 2025, the Euro managed to record one of its strongest rallies since 2016 against the sterling and the US Dollar, its strongest rally since 2017. President Trump’s tariff policy proved to be extremely beneficial for the Euro*, and despite several interest rate cuts, the ECB’s (European Central Bank) boosting of the local economy was considered most beneficial. Some analysts favour another rate cut in 2026, but most appear to favour the ECB remaining on the sidelines as ECB President Christine Lagarde and her board of governors seem content with both the outlook for growth and inflation.

US Tariffs Beneficial to the Euro – Whilst tariffs were not inherently beneficial to the Euro (they often hurt EU exporters), they could indirectly strengthen the Euro by making EU goods reactively more expensive for U.S. buyers or causing US consumers to buy cheaper EU goods when tariffs were applied to other countries –  thus improving the competitive field for EU products in the US market leading to potential Euro strength.

A number of analysts have a bullish stance for the Euro in 2026, expecting the currency to gain against most currencies, except those in Scandinavia, with reservations against the pound sterling. Exchange experts have predicted that by year-end 2026, the EUR/USD will stand at 1.22, expecting the majority of US Dollar weakness to emerge after Q1, whilst projections for sterling and Japanese yen are EUR/GBP 0.84 and EUR/JPY 189. Analysts suggest that positive impacts on the currency will emerge post Q1, such as German fiscal policy, Chinese stimulus measures and currency hedging activities.

Adding to the bullish sentiment for the Euro, experts advise that foreign investors have returned to the European equity and bond markets, and with the ECB currently happy with inflation, 2026 should see a continuation of the inflow of capital. Analysts suggest that the inflow should increase if Russia and Ukraine manage to sign a peace accord to end the war. On 23rd February 2025, a German government coalition was formed, and later they passed a Euro 1 trillion spending package, which experts feel will continue to support the Euro. One downside is France and the country’s ongoing political turmoil, which did limit gains in 2025, and analysts believe this will carry on into 2026.

Japanese Yen – JPY

Currency experts advise that the demand for Yen in 2026 will remain modest, leaning towards tepid in response to the BOJ’s (Bank of Japan) raising interest rates by 25 basis points to 0.75% (the highest level since September 1995) on 19th December 2025. Currency experts suggest that the soft response to the increase in interest rates is that financial markets are worried about Japan’s fiscal sustainability, especially as they feel there is an unfavourable policy mix of expansionary fiscal policy with loose monetary policy, which continues in real terms to keep yields low in Japan.

Some analysts suggest that the narrowing interest rate differential between Japanese bonds and their counterparts in the United States represents a fundamental driver in 2026 for an increase in the strength of the Japanese yen. If the Federal Reserve proceeds with expected interest rate cuts in 2026 and the BOJ proceeds with expected interest rate hikes, analysts advise that there should be downward pressure on USD/JPY during 2026. Financial markets are also aware of Yen carry trades, and sharp currency movements in either direction could precipitate an unwinding of these positions, currently valued by some analysts at USD 1 trillion.

Swiss Franc – CHF

The outlook for the Swiss Franc in 2026 is that investors will still view the currency as a very strong haven in times of global economic volatility and geopolitical upheavals. However, some experts suggest that if global economic and geopolitical conditions begin to stabilise in 2026, the currency could gradually weaken against the Pound Sterling and the Euro, especially if interest rate differentials come into play.

Other key drivers for the CHF  are economic growth divergence, where analysts forecast that the Euro may appreciate slightly against the CHF if, during 2026, a modest recovery occurs in the Eurozone and other key trading partners, reducing the premium on Switzerland’s haven status. Monetary policy divergence is another driver, and analysts advise that the SNB will probably keep interest rates low or even move to 0.00%, whilst the Federal Reserve and maybe the ECB will adjust their policies, which in turn can affect exchange rates.

Overall, the main arguments in favour of the Swiss Franc are low inflation, low debt, political stability, a high current account surplus and a highly innovative economy. Couple the above with the recent agreement on tariffs with the Trump administration, which has eliminated a serious threat to the country’s competitiveness, the Swiss Franc stands out as a top safe-haven currency. Several forex analysts predict that in 2026, the EUR/CHF will edge higher, whilst it is felt that the USD/CHF may stabilise around the 0.78 mark.

Chinese Renminbi  – CNY

A number of experts and analysts have forecasted a slight appreciation of the Renminbi against the US Dollar in 2026, with the USD/CNY ending the year in a range of 6.85 and 7.05. Such predictions are based on a persistently large current account surplus, the PBoC’s (People’s Bank of China) priority on currency stability and narrowing yield differentials with the USA. With regards to currency stability, the PBoC is expected to utilise policy tools such as the daily fixing, which manages volatility and to continue with gradual monetary easing, which includes rates and RRR (Reserve Requirement Ratio)* cuts in order to support domestic growth.

*Reserve Requirement Ratio – This represents the portion of deposits that banks in China must hold in reserve, and ifthe  PBoC cuts the RRR, it will boost liquidity and support economic growth. Interestingly, the RRR is not uniform, with larger banks having a RRR of 9% and smaller banks 6%.

On the domestic front, challenges like the current property market downturn, deflationary pressures and weak consumer demand could negatively impact appreciation pressures on the currency, whilst geopolitical pressures such as trade tensions between China and the United States (currently enjoying what may be a temporary truce*) could also put negative pressure on the Renminbi. However, further fiscal policy will be seen by the issuance of front-loaded 2026 bonds in Q1 of this year, plus the implementation of two RMB 500 billion stimulus packages introduced at the end of Q3 and beginning of Q4 last year.

*Trade Truce – The current trade tensions between the United States and China are currently enjoying a one-year sabbatical, which could be thrown into disarray as President Trump is threatening 25% tariffs on goods from all countries that trade with Iran.

Australian Dollar – AUD

Experts suggest a fairly positive outlook for the Aussie Dollar in 2026, with potential appreciation against a number of currencies, especially the US Dollar, with drivers suggested as strong commodity prices and diverging monetary policies. The RBA (Reserve Bank of Australia) has, amid upward inflationary pressures, adopted a somewhat hawkish stance with financial markets pricing in an early rate hike in 2026, whilst the Federal Reserve are again expected to implement one or two rate cuts this year with experts predicting a negative impact on the US Dollar and a positive impact on the Australian currency.

On the commodity front, the AUD and commodity exports are closely tied together (e.g. Iron Ore $116 Billion, Oil and Gas $82.5 Billion, LNG $72.6 Billion, Coal Mining $71.4 Billion), and significant support for the currency is expected to come from continuing strength and an across-the-board recovery in global commodity prices. Furthermore, the health of China’s economy is an important driver of the AUD (not the primary driver that it used to be) as it is Australia’s biggest trading partner. Foreign exchange experts are predicting that by the close of business in 2026, AUD/USD is expected to be near the 0.68 level.

Canadian Dollar – CAD

Along with the United States, both countries are signatories to the US-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA – replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement – NAFTA in July 2000), which is up for renegotiation this year, with President Donald Trump threatening to withdraw even though it makes up 25% of trade with the USA. Whilst no one can predict the outcome of the review, this is a potential wild card that can impact both the Canadian and Mexican currencies.

Analysts expect the Canadian Dollar (AKA the Loonie*) to strengthen against the US Dollar if, as expected, the Federal Reserve continues its monetary easing cycle by cutting rates again in 2026, whilst the BoC (Bank of Canada) has signalled the possibility of halting monetary easing in 2026. As a result, several forex analysts have suggested that at the end of Q2, the USD/CAD could be sitting at 1.3488 and at the end of 2026, it is projected to sit at 1.3507.

*The Loonie – The Canadian Dollar is also affectionately referred to as “the Loonie” because in 1987 a popular $1 coin was introduced into the monetary system featuring a “common loon” (a distinctive waterbird) on its reverse side.

Experts are expecting the Canadian economy to enjoy a modest positive impetus in 2026, projecting a growth of circa 1.4% with support coming from government investment/spending initiatives, plus a potentially improving trade outlook, giving the Canadian Dollar a boost in Q3 and Q4. A negative review of the USMCA could result in an escalation in current trade tensions, weighing negatively on the currency, whilst a fall in oil prices is expected to have the same effect.

Mexican Pesos – MXN

In 2025, the Mexican Peso closed out the year 22% higher than the beginning of the year against the US Dollar, and underlying the increase were higher interest rates in Mexico, whilst the Federal Reserve engaged in monetary easing, and companies exporting to the USA moved their manufacturing base to the United States. Further positive impacts on the Peso were strong wage growth, new records for international visitors and tourism and stable economic conditions under the current President, Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo.

Experts advise that continued high rates relative to interest rates in the United States into 2026 will make Mexican Assets attractive under the carry trade scenarios, which will provide a positive impact for the Peso especially if the Federal Reserve continues on its dovish monetary path. If continued international tourism increases, plus ongoing nearshoring* together with continued FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) into Mexico, such factors will continue driving strong demand for the currency. According to a number of analysts in the peso arena, they expect the currency to remain around 19 pesos per dollar in 2026, though there are those analysts who predict that the peso will end the year in the upper 17-peso range.

*Nearshoring – is a business strategy where a company moves its base of manufacturing or services usually to a country that is geographically close or shares a border with the country the company is exporting to, e.g. Mexico/USA.

Emerging Market Currencies Overview

Experts from emerging markets (EM) suggest the outlook for currencies in 2026 is fairly positive, with the expectation that they will appreciate against the US Dollar due to a dovish Federal Reserve monetary policy. Capital inflows into EM assets will be encouraged by the anticipated Federal Reserve interest rate cuts, improving EM economic fundamentals and moderating inflation. Currently, EM assets are trading at a discount to their counterparts in the developed economies, which is attracting capital inflows, especially as investors seek yield and portfolio diversification.

What are the Consequences of a United States Invasion and Takeover of Greenland?

A Shift from Rhetoric to Reality

Once unthinkable, today the staggering reality is that the United States of America, under the leadership of President Donald Trump, could actually invade and claim ownership of Greenland, a country owned by its European ally, the Kingdom of Denmark. Last Friday, 9th January, President Trump increased his rhetoric by saying, “I would like to make a deal, you know, the easy way. But if we don’t do it the easy way, we are going to do it the hard way.” In other words, he is willing to secure the territory by abusing international law by marching into Greenland and taking over.

The Shadow of Venezuela and the NATO Crisis

In the past, the musings of President Trump about taking over Greenland were not taken seriously by his European allies (members of NATO* – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation). The recent invasion of Venezuela has brought home the stark reality that President Trump could easily live up to his word and invade Greenland. As usual, when it comes to geopolitical and global economic surprises, the leaders of the EU (European Union) have been found wanting. Indeed, Mette Frederiksen, Prime Minister of Denmark, said an attack by the United States on Greenland could spell the end of NATO.

*NATO – the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is a political and military alliance of 32 countries from Europe, North America and Great Britain. Founded in 1949 for collective security and mutual defence against aggression, NATO was created primarily to counter Soviet aggression, with its core principle being Article 5: an attack on one member is an attack on all, obligating members to assist. NATO provides a forum for defence consultation and cooperation, managing crises and ensuring the security of its members. Today, we have a scenario where the strongest member (the United States) potentially attacks a weaker member; the consequences to geopolitics and global economics are potentially devastating.

Strategic Objectives: Security and Resources

Experts now suggest that since the invasion of Venezuela, President Trump is now willing to deploy the U.S. military to achieve his foreign policy goals, with Greenland currently top of the President’s shopping list. In both his presidential campaigns, Trump’s table-thumping mantra of “America First” has never been more pertinent to both his enemies and his allies, but what is it about Greenland that has given President Trump his thirst for invasion? Experts say that the President wants America to own Greenland for national security reasons and not for rare earth minerals; however, in recent years, both Russia and China have become interested in the minerals that can be found in Greenland, not to mention the potential bonanza of oil and gas reserves.

The China-Russia Security Threat

In the United States, many Republican lawmakers agree with President Trump that China and Russia pose a significant security risk—a threat that would increase dramatically if either country gained controlling influence over Greenland. Consequently, experts foresee two potential paths: President Trump could reach an economic agreement with Denmark for joint control, or he could simply leverage the military might of the United States to secure the territory, given that few could realistically stand in the way.

The European Response and Territorial Integrity

However, the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederickson, has warned that any attempt to take over Greenland would result in the end of the long-standing transatlantic alliance. Furthermore, she recently announced on Danish TV that Greenland belongs to Greenlanders, whilst European leaders have urged President Trump to respect the island’s territorial integrity and said it falls under the bloc’s collective security umbrella. 

The consequences of a move to Greenland by the United States will be far-reaching. Currently, in Europe, political analysts advise that the continent is paralysed, with no set strategy to address the threats from President Trump. Experts suggest that if the situation deteriorates even further, with one member of NATO turning against another, NATO will not survive. The EU (European Union) is not designed to step in militarily if NATO collapses. 

The “Donroe Doctrine” and Global Instability

President Trump has already deposed the President of Venezuela (citing the Munro Doctrine*), citing influence from Russia and China, plus drug flows, as his reasons. The United States has coveted Greenland on and off for over 150 years, and as President Trump ups the ante over Greenland, one expert suggests that transatlantic relations are now on the brink of a fundamental breakdown. On top of this, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Keir Starmer, has suggested putting British troops into Greenland. Imagine two NATO allies in direct conflict over Danish territory; the geopolitical implications are unthinkable.

*The Munro Doctrine – Declared by President James Munro in 1823, this was a U.S. foreign policy stating that the Americas were no longer open to European colonisation and warned against European interference in the Western Hemisphere, whilst the U.S. pledged non-interference in European affairs, establishing distinct spheres of influence and becoming a cornerstone of centuries of U.S. foreign policy. Key tenets include non-colonisation, non-intervention in European politics and separating American and European political systems and later expanded to justify intervention in “Latin America”.

Global Repercussions: Russia and Taiwan

On the global front, experts suggest that the United States/Greenland saga must be music to the ears of Russia’s President Putin, and not only will it legitimise in his eyes the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but also embolden him to further increase military and political pressure on the country’s leaders, hoping that they will sue for peace. Elsewhere, and as most people know, China’s leaders have always thought that the independent and sovereign state of Taiwan belongs to China, and the potential takeover by the United States of Greenland will surely embolden them to invade Taiwan. Several experts have agreed that these scenarios are a distinct possibility, and with the President of Venezuela already deposed, both China and Russia may view the potential invasion of Greenland as a green light for their own political ambitions.

The Semiconductor Crisis and the Cost of “America First”

Interestingly, Taiwan manufactures over 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of its most advanced chips. Some experts suggest that, emboldened by President Trump’s actions in Venezuela or a potential move into Greenland, China may decide to invade Taiwan. Such a move would grant China control over nearly 90% of the global microchip supply, effectively making the United States and Europe dependent on China for everything from mobile phones and electric vehicles to basic household appliances like washing machines and tumble dryers. 

Analysts suggest that in order to compensate for this, the United States would have to develop increased chip-making facilities, which would need circa 50 critical minerals. Yes, Greenland has about 30 of these minerals, but with no industrial infrastructure or workforce, how long would it take the United States to catch up? All in all, President Trump’s ‘America First’ may well turn out to be a pyrrhic victory with China holding the trump cards on critical minerals and semiconductors/microchips. What concessions will then have to be made by the West to the potential upcoming political demands from China?

Digital Markets at Odds Over the Future of Bitcoin in 2026

Experts, analysts and digital commentators in the Bitcoin arena seem to be at odds with one another, with some predicting that Bitcoin could fall to around USD 50,000, whilst others are predicting a dramatic increase to around USD 150,000 and above. However, there is general agreement that currently, there are constant changes in liquidity. Institutional demand and monetary policy will all affect how Bitcoin performs in 2026, with some market experts coming down on the positive side, whilst others predict a negative impact on the digital coin.

Market Performance: 2025 – 2026

Taking a brief look at 2025, a number of experts suggested that Bitcoin would reach record highs of between USD 175,000 and USD 200,000 and above by the close of business 31st December 2025.  These were historic predictions; however, whilst Bitcoin reached a high of USD 126,080 on 6th October 2025, it was followed by a well-documented crash four days later, exposing the underlying fragility and unpredictability of the digital coin. However, some experts were quick to point out that the crash was not a fundamental failure of Bitcoin but a massive liquidity event, with traders unloading huge overexposed positions.

In 2025, there was a fundamental shift in who actually traded Bitcoin, with the digital asset becoming a big part of institutional investment and losing its retail-driven only tag. As such, once the big investment banks (Wall Street) arrived on the scene, the price of Bitcoin was not driven by ideology or retail sentiment but by risk assessment, in-house policy, positioning and liquidity. Originally, the coin was seen as a hedge against Federal Reserve policy and to some extent, it still is today; however, it is now more sensitive to their policy than ever before.

As of this writing, Bitcoin has dropped just under 30% from its October 6th high to USD 89,363.29. Although the post-halving rally* and spot ETFs were intended to bring clarity to the market, they have unfortunately further polarised the 2026 forecast battleground.

*Bitcoin Halving – Halving is a programmed event occurring roughly every four years (or 210,000 blocks**) that cuts the reward for mining Bitcoin by 50%, reducing the rate at which new coins enter circulation; therefore, increasing scarcity and reducing inflation, which historically has influenced price increases due to the reduction in the supply of the digital coin.

**Blocks – digital containers that bundle together verified transactions, forming pages in the shared public ledger known as the blockchain, with miners competing to solve complex maths puzzles. The winner gets to add the new block containing transactions to the blockchain, earning newly minted Bitcoin as a reward.

Positive Impact on Bitcoin

Several prominent Bitcoin proponents remain highly bullish, suggesting that the cryptocurrency could reach USD 250,000 by 2026. This growth is attributed to the asset’s fixed supply and the potential for increased institutional adoption as a hedge against the unpredictability of major fiat currencies. Furthermore, one senior figure predicts that Bitcoin will surpass USD 200,000 by the end of Q1 2026, driven by shifting monetary dynamics rather than long-term adoption metrics.

Other experts were less bullish, claiming that Bitcoin would hit USD 150,000 – USD 200,000, noting that ETFs would have growing resilience over direct accumulation but would experience slower corporate treasury adoption. Another suggestion is that a USD 150,000 figure is more plausible due to more institutional participation, monetary conditions and the increasing regulatory process.

Negative Impact on Bitcoin

There are some extreme bears in the Bitcoin market, with one analyst suggesting that the digital asset could go as low as USD 25,000, due to a breakdown in the coin’s long-term technical structure. Another suggests that Bitcoin could, after reaching low to mid-six figures, go as low as USD 10,000 due to tightening liquidity and fading speculative demand. However, some analysts predict a year of consolidation in the Bitcoin arena, suggesting a price range of between circa USD 65,000 – USD 75,000.

Elsewhere, some experts expound the theory that an AI bubble burst could be a catalyst for downward pressure on Bitcoin, and if an extreme bear market were to hit Bitcoin, it would require a convergence, a prolonged risk-off environment, the tightening of global liquidity and a structural shock. Experts suggest that a structural shock could emerge if digital asset treasuries began selling into an already fragile market, which cannot absorb that level of supply.

Looking Ahead to 2026

However, digital asset commentators suggest that the pro bull marketeers outnumber their peers on the bear front, and the general feeling for Bitcoin in 2026 is optimistic. Many experts feel that after the October 6th 2025 collapse, the Bitcoin market has emerged stronger from the readjustment and will therefore prosper in 2026. Overall, the forecasts reflect uncertainty over what will happen to Bitcoin, and Q1 in 2026 may well map out the fortunes for the digital asset in the coming year.

The Bank of Japan Raises Interest Rates to Their Highest Level in 30 Years

Interest Rate Decision and Market Reaction

Today, the BOJ (Bank of Japan) in a unanimous and widely expected decision raised its key interest rate to 0.75%, being the highest level since September 1995, whilst at the same time signalling that more interest rate increases are still to come. Experts pointed out that financial markets had predicted the increase in rates, and the yen weakened due to a lack of a stronger commitment from the central bank regarding further increases. After the rate decision, and in the usual non-committal verbiage of central bank chiefs worldwide, the Governor of the BOJ, Kazuo Ueda, said, “We’ll keep making appropriate decisions at each policy meeting, and the pace at which we adjust our rate will depend on the state of the economy and prices.”

Shift Away from Negative Interest Rates

In 2025, the central bank began abandoning negative interest rates, which had been in place since 2016, and data show that they have been gradually lifting interest rates, stating that their ambition was to see a “virtuous cycle” of rising wages and prices. The decision to increase rates came as the new Prime Minister of Japan, Sanae Takaichi, said she is keen to bring inflation down, but at the same time keeping government borrowing as cheap as possible. Interestingly, last year, before she took office, Prime Minister Takaichi described the idea of rate increases as stupid. However, since she took office in October of this year, she has not criticised the central bank governor.

Inflation Developments and Policy Constraints

Prime Minister Takaichi has made inflation her government’s priority, and recently released data showed underlying or core inflation (excluding food and energy) had increased to 3.00% in November, which is still 2.00% higher than the BOJ’s target benchmark figure. However, some financial market experts suggest that the rise in interest rates will not have a positive effect on inflation, as currency markets have already priced in the rate increase, confirming that the Japanese Yen remains relatively weak. Experts suggest that it may not be until Q3 that the BOJ hikes interest rates again due to Prime Minister Takaichi’s stand on monetary policy, plus the central bank will have to wait and see how today’s rate increase impacts the real economy*.

*The Real Economy – is defined as that part of the economy which is focused on producing, selling and consuming actual goods and services such as food, cars, haircuts, and construction that satisfy human needs. It is distinct from financial markets that trade in stocks and shares, bonds, loans, etc., that trade in money and assets.

Growth and Inflation Outlook

Experts in the Japanese economy have predicted a moderate yet stable growth of 0.60% for 2026, driven by domestic demand, ongoing corporate governance reforms and corporate investment in technology. However, some analysts have predicted that there may be a slowdown in growth from 2025 levels due to the impact of President Trump’s tariffs, plus a downturn in some other nations’ economies. On the inflation front, the BOJ has predicted that core inflation will decelerate to a range of 1.50% – 2.00%. Overall, experts and financial commentators suggest that the outlook is cautiously positive, with the economy expected to navigate a transition toward sustainable growth and mild inflation, subject to external risks and the careful management of domestic policy reforms.

European Central Bank Holds Interest Rates

ECB Rate Decision and Market Reaction

Yesterday, the ECB (European Central Bank), for their fourth straight meeting, held its benchmark deposit rate* at 2% with the Euro essentially unchanged at $1.1740, but declined slightly against the Swiss Franc by close of business by 0.32%. The decision by policymakers was unanimous and in line with market expectations, and the President of the ECB, Christine Lagarde, was noted as saying that there had been no discussions regarding rate cuts or rises. Experts in this area say that ECB officials have indicated that, given the outlook for inflation and economic growth, quantitative easing, in the form of interest rate cuts, is likely to be finished.

*ECB Interest Rates – The ECB has three interest rates: the key deposit rate, which, as mentioned above, was held at 2.00% and is the interest rate banks receive when they deposit money overnight with the ECB. The other two facilities are the Main Refinancing Operations (rate held at 2.15%), which is the rate the banks pay when they borrow money from the ECB for one week, and the Marginal Lending Facility (rate held at 2.40%), which is the rate banks pay when they borrow money overnight from the ECB.

Inflation Outlook and Economic Uncertainty

Officials advised that they are now expecting annual inflation for 2026 to be in the region of 1.9% as opposed to their earlier prediction of 1.7%, which is due to elevated price increases in services, which will be falling more slowly than was predicted. President Lagarde followed this up by saying that the inflation outlook was more uncertain than usual due to the vagaries of the volatile international environment. Indeed, in a statement by the ECB, it was announced that an uncertain global outlook would push down growth within the eurozone, and officials renewed appeals for governments within the EU (European Union) to push ahead with reforms to make the economy more competitive and efficient.

Future Growth Drivers and Inflation Expectations

In a further announcement, President Lagarde said that in the years ahead, domestic demand will be the main engine of expansion. She went on to say, “Business investment and substantial government spending on infrastructure and defence should increasingly underpin the economy. However, the challenging environment for global trade is likely to remain a drag. Inflation should decline in the near term, mostly because energy prices will drop out of the annual rates, and it should then return to target in mid 2028, amid a strong rise in energy inflation.”