Will Private Credit Trigger Another Systemic Financial Collapse?
A number of financial commentators have recently opined that recent ructions in the private credit market might bring about a repeat of the GFC (Global Financial Crisis) that the world suffered 18 years ago in 2008. Such commentators advised that investors were getting skittish with regards to the $3.50 trillion in AUM (assets under management), and for the first time, recent inward investments of $5 Billion were overshadowed by outflows/redemptions of $7 Billion. Also, a recent report on 6th May 2026 by the FSB, (Financial Stability Board, headquarters basel, Switzerland) highlighted not just the benefits, but real vulnerabilities including complex interlinkages with banks, borrower credit quality concerns, and valuation opacity.
Shifting Sectors and Transparency Deficits
Analysts suggest that data shows some funds have lent heavily to companies in the software and tech sectors where existential threats from AI could exist, plus there are worries of an AI bubble bursting. Furthermore, the private credit market is suffering from a lack of transparency making it difficult to summarise what and how strong lender protections are in place, plus making it just as difficult to understand how loans in this market are performing.
Institutional Exposure and Global Footprint
Private credit experts point to the massive sector exposure held by traditional financial institutions. Current data confirms that non-bank financial institutions hold circa $2 trillion in private credit exposure, followed by insurance companies at roughly $1 trillion, and banks with approximately $300 billion. The US currently dominates the $3.5 trillion private credit market accounting for circa 75% of global activity, with Europe in second place accounting for circa EUR400 billion in AUM.
Lessons from 2008: The Subprime Catalyst
However, various experts point out that during the 2008 financial crisis, the initial subprime market was actually quite small. The widespread economic damage was ultimately driven by complex derivatives and the enormous leverage built up on top of those subprime loans. Everything began to grow exponentially when banks bought subprime loans and packaged them into MBS (Mortgage Backed Securities)**.
*The Subprime Market 2008 – This was a segment of the lending industry that provided mortgages to high-risk borrowers with poor credit scores or low incomes. As these borrowers were more likely to default, lenders charged higher interest rates, and history shows the mass defaults in this area triggered the 2008 GFC.
**MBS/Mortgage Backed Securities – These were the primary catalysts for the 2008 GFC. They are financial products where banks bundle thousands of individual home loans together and sell them to investors who are looking for high-yield bonds. Many of the buyers were from Wall Street who repackaged the MBS into CDOs (Collateralised Debt Obligations)***.
***CDO/Collateralised Debt Obligation 2008 – These were complex financial instruments that pooled together various debt assets (e.g., mortgages) and repackaged them into tranches with varying levels of risk, from AAA down to junk being the subprime mortgages. However, because of the senior risk packaged into the CDOs, the rating agencies gave them a AAA rating allowing institutions such as global banks to purchase these instruments without risk.
The Collapsing House of Cards
In short, when the subprime mortgages failed, they brought down the whole house of cards as the global market for CDOs exceeded $1.5 trillion (of which 700 billion contained subprime MBS). As the subprime borrowers began to default the CDOs effectively became worthless, forcing global banks to write down hundreds of billions of dollars. This engendered a lack of trust between banks, who refused to lend to each other wiping out the wholesale market. As a result, some of the major banking names had to be bailed out. Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank in the US, with 25,000 employees worldwide, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on 15th September 2008.
Synthetic CDOs and the Insurance Multiplier
However, there was another player in the collapse of the banking system in 2008, that is the synthetic CDO which was a complex financial derivative that actually accelerated the financial crisis. This synthetic CDO did not hold actual mortgages. Instead, it referenced a portfolio of MBS. Investors in this instrument sold Credit Default Swaps (CDS) on those reference assets in exchange for regular premium payouts. The primary buyers of these CDS were hedge funds looking to bet against the housing market.
*Credit Default Swaps – This is a financial derivative that acts like an insurance policy against a borrower defaulting on a debt, such as a corporate bond, loan, or a CDO. Investors use it to protect themselves from losses or to speculate on the financial health of an entity.
This type of CDO required no cash, just a derivative contract, and those in this market were able to create multiple synthetic CDOs on the same pool of MBS, magnifying the number of bets tied to a single underlying home loan. The dominant seller of the underlying insurance was AIG (American International Group) who did not bother to hedge their risk, as the rating agencies also issued AAA ratings on the synthetic CDO. When the crash arrived on September 15th, 2008, AIG were on the hook for a staggering $32 billion, which they could obviously not cover, the rating agencies slashed AIG’s credit rating, and they had to be bailed out by the US government.
Structural Divergence: Private Credit vs. Subprime Debt
In today’s market, some experts are saying that private credit is not the same as subprime and private credit is just another term for direct lending. The derivative structures (CDOs synthetic CDOs*) and unhedged insurance cover on credit default swaps, that turned the subprime losses into a global disaster simply do not exist in a comparative form in the private credit market.
This does not mean to say that there won’t be a crisis in the private credit arena, but probably not to the extent that plagued the financial system in 2008. However, when a private credit fund struggles, losses will appear on the lending banks balance sheet as they provided the leveraged funds for the loan book in the first place.
Regulatory Safeguards: The Basel III Framework
After the 2008 crisis, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the central bank for central bankers, issued updated rules for Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. This meant commercial banks had to hold significantly more capital on their balance sheets to prepare for future downturns. Over the years, regional central banks have used strict financial stress tests to ensure local institutions comply with these BIS requirements.
The Risks of Contemporary Deregulation
However, regulators in the US are actively loosening banking constraints, making one of the most significant rollbacks since the GFC 2008. Federal agencies have advanced sweeping proposals to reduce Tier 1 capital requirements and ease leveraged lending restrictions, effectively freeing up billions of dollars in Wall Street lending. Many experts, analysts and financial commentators fear the worst, as when President Trump loosened up financial restrictions in his first term, the US went on to suffer from the regional banking crisis.
Looking Ahead: A Wait-and-See Market
As always, lessons from the past are soon forgotten, and if the private credit market does become a problem, and it may not replicate the GFC in 2008, but with Tier 1 capital adequacy rules being torn up in the USA, markets can only wait and see what potential fallouts may present themselves to the global economy as a whole.
